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Feminist retorts are the offspring of feminist theories united with
tort law. Part of my project in this Article is to use feminist insights to
provide "retorts," or replies, to legal theorists, judges and practitioners
who are thinking and writing about the "liability crisis."' Dictionaries
define "retorts" as replies to previous speakers. 2 But my use of the word
"retort" is more complicated than its dictionary definition. In law, torts

are traditionally defined as legal wrongs, independent of contract, that
result in personal injuries, property damage or loss. 3 Torts (as part of the
word "(re)torts") is appropriately part of the title because legal torts,
particularly mass torts caused by corporate for-profit activities and products, 4 are central to this Article.

When the word "torts" is combined with the prefix "re," additional
meanings of the title emerge. For example, in law we use the word "re"
1. The tort or liability crisis, which for simplicity I call the "liability crisis," has resulted from

a combination of features that have led to the legal system's inability to cope with the volume of tort
litigation. Some tort critics attribute the crisis to greedy, litigious plaintiffs, overzealous and avaricious plaintiffs' attorneys, liberalized rules of causation, discovery rules that extend liability periods,
uncapped damages, and the like. Their proposed responses to the crisis are reflected in the recent
spate of tort reform legislation and proposed legislation. I argue in this Article that the liability
crisis is more appropriately attributed to corporate behaviors and the mass harms they cause, rather
than to any of the previously noted factors.
2. Webster's Dictionarydefines the noun "retort" as "1: a quick sharp witty cutting or severe
reply; esp: one that turns the first speaker's statement or argument against himtsic] or counters it 2:
the act or practice of making retorts." WEBSTER's THIR NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1939 (1981). If webster's definition were the only meaning of "retort," this Article would fall off the
mark of its title-it does not meet the criterion of quick (being far too long-winded) and whether or
not it is sharp or witty is seriously open to debate. It may be that the only arguably witty part of this
entire Article is the attempted pun in the title.
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1484 (6th ed. 1990).

4. I use "mass torts" as a catch-all phrase to represent widespread, multi-victim personal injuries caused by corporate for-profit conduct. Within the term "mass tort" I include products liability
and toxic torts. I recognize that mass torts have been distinguished from toxic torts. See MICHAEL
DORE, LAW OF TOXIC TORTS § 2.03 (1987). A similar distinction has been drawn between "high
stakes" litigation and mass latent injury cases. See Deborah Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation:
Findingsfrom the Institutefor Civil Justice's Research, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 478, 480 (1987). Although
those notions are distinguishable, they are sufficiently similar to be treated alike for the purposes of
my arguments about: (1) wrongfully blaming tort law for corporate violence and political-social
problems, (2) the commodification of harms and the gap between our articulated values and our legal
rules, (3) the need to balance power between litigants, and (4) reformulating our understanding of
responsibility (particularly in the context of corporate wrongdoing). Others have argued that the
categories of toxic tort and mass tort are too broad and need to be broken down into subelasses. See
Sanford Gaines, A Taxonomy for Toxic Torts Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 826 (Nov. 30, 1988);
Kenneth Abraham, IndividualAction and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma ofMass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REv. 845 (1987) [hereinafter Abraham, Dilemma of Mass Tort].
I would prefer to use the term "corporate torts," instead of either mass torts or toxic torts, to
represent personal injuries caused by corporate activities and risk imposition. I am apprehensive
about changing the language in this Article for two reasons: (.4) researchers who look for writings in
this area will probably use terms like "mass tort" and "toxic tort" to locate them, and more importantly, (2) the term "corporate torts" may be misinterpreted to include torts between corporations
for economic harms, which I specifically intend to exclude from this argument.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1990:848

to mean "in the matter of" or "in the case of."'5 In that sense In re Torts

might mean in the matter of or in the case of torts. This is another possible interpretation of this Article's title. More precisely, however, I am
using the "re" prefix to mean "again, anew, over again."' 6 "(Re)torts" in
this sense means torts anew, torts rethought, torts reconstructed, torts
reimagined. By "feminist (re)torts" I mean torts rethought or recon-

structed through feminist legal method 7 and with feminist goals and
value choices. 8
INTRODUCTION

The common law tort system 9 has been an object of sustained attack
by legal scholars, the defense bar, corporate America, government officials, and the insurance industry.10 One aim of this Article is to provide
a "retort" to these criticisms. I write both to praise the existence of com-

mon law mass tort and at the same time to bury it in its current form. I
argue, in one breath, that we must save the tort system from its attackers
because it serves important purposes that cannot be met by other means,
and in the next, that common law tort is in need of radical reform. The

contradiction notwithstanding, both positions seem persuasive to me.
5. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1263 (6th ed. 1990).
6. See, ag., WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1888 (1981) (defiuiing
"re"as "again: anew").
7. Professor Katharine Bartlett has recently made a valiant attempt to describe feminist legal
method. Katharine Bartlett, FeministLegal Methods 103 HARv. L. REv. 829 (1990) (feminist legal
method includes: (1) asking the woman questions about how women and others have been left out
and what differences that might make; (2) using feminist practical reasoning; and (3) consciousnessraising); see also CATHARINE MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989);
Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primeron Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Bender, A Lawyer's Primer].
By labeling my torts critique feminist, I do not mean to imply that there is a unitary, or even a
preferred, feminist position. Feminist theories are rich, multiple, and very complex. I am certain
that some feminist legal theorists will disagree with my chosen strategy and perhaps even with my
feminist analysis within this strategy. I welcome their critiques and insights, because I have enormous respect for the work they do and my thinking is always advanced by theirs. Even though there
are wide theoretical disagreements among feminists, I feel comfortable naming my critique feminist,
and I think feminist legal scholars would feel comfortable including this Article in their body of

work. In a recent essay I have explained my justifications for choosing this feminist theoretical
position and strategy. Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol
Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REv. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Bender, Feminist
Solidarity].
8. Finally, I cannot leave out the intriguing relationship between the words (at least the sound
of the words) "retort" and "rhetoric." Feminist theories provide powerful rhetorics, or persuasive
discourses, for change.
9. By "common law tort" or the "common law tort system," I mean the integrated activities
of judges, lawyers, juries and parties, from which rules, principles and precedents governing the
resolution of personal injury claims are developed.
10. See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
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More central to this Article than my responsive critiques of the critics of common law tort is my own criticism of our legal system and its
values. My critique of mass tort law primarily focuses on its over-reliance on an economic, cost-based analysis of liability and its acquiescence
in traditional legal understandings of corporations and their uses of
power. In this Article, I resist the ways that common law tort ignores
the power dynamics between parties, and I challenge how tort law understands the meaning of legal responsibility in order to construct new kinds
of tort remedies. I propose a shift in the value paradigm that informs
tort law, and I make concrete suggestions for changes in mass tort litigation that could be implemented immediately to begin a transformation of
our legal system.
Critics have blamed common law tort and tort victims for many of
the problems associated with the liability crisis.'1 Part I of this Article
challenges this "blame the victim" approach taken in most contemporary
explanations of the liability crisis. Common law tort is not the cause of
the problem; rather, it represents a valiant effort to respond to its real
causes-corporate violence and corporate irresponsibility' 2-while fighting the tide of our socially encouraged quest for corporate profits, new
technologies, and a bigger slice of the pie. Part I does not focus on particular writings about the crisis, 13 but instead is an impressionistic mosaic
intended to persuade readers that tort victims and evolving tort law are
not the causes of the liability crisis. The liability crisis is due to mass
harms that are caused by the products and conduct of large, publiclytraded, and multinational corporations.' 4 Mass harms and public risks
occur during the organized, planned, and aggressive pursuit of commercial self-interest. The legally sanctioned nature of huge corporate enterprises permits undemocratically imposed risks, avoidance of direct and
11. For examples of most of these criticisms of common law tort, see generally Stephen
Sugarman, Taking Advantage ofthe Torts CrisLs, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 329 (1987) [hereinafter Sugarman,
Taking Advantage]; Issues in Tort Reform, 48 Osno ST. L.. 317 (1987) (Symposium). For a further
elaboration of all these criticisms and responses, see infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
12. Corporations' creations of risks and impositions of harm have overburdened and outpaced
the capacity of the legal system. For a discussion of the amount of litigation attributable to corporate harm-causing products, see infra note 18. 1 am arguing for a rethinking of corporate power and
its structures and against our acceptance of their violence and destruction as an inevitable by-prod-

uct of progress.
13. For an example of such a critique, see Mark Hager, Civil CompensationandIts Discontent

A Response to Huber, 42 STAN. L. REv. 301 (1990).
14. Although many of my observations might also be relevant to other incidents of tort harms,
I will focus on mass torts caused by large, publicly-held corporations. Characteristics of these mass
harms and public risks make the application of special rules appropriate and necessary. The commercial activities and products of corporations that result in mass harms require a separately devised

system of common law rules.
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personal responsibility, as well as great imbalances in power and resources between corporations and those injured by corporate conduct.
Part II examines a few structural characteristics of our legal-political system that are more appropriately blamed for the liability crisis
than is common law tort. In particular, I illustrate how adherence to the
public/private and the individual/collective dichotomies disables the law
from effectively dealing with corporations and their harm-causing activities. I also concentrate on how our political-legal system is foiled by its
singular focus on monetizing and commodifying injury, responsibility,
and justice. These structural features have infected mass tort law and
fueled the liability crisis. I argue that because these flaws are not caused
by or attributable to tort law, critics' proposed changes in tort law will
not eradicate the liability crisis. We must look more deeply into our legal
and political structures and value systems.
In Part III, I propose solutions to some of the structural injustices of
contemporary mass tort litigation that can be immediately implemented.
Part III explores the double sacrifice that our society and its common
law tort system exacts from injured persons. Mass tort victims must bear
the burdens of their injuries, as well as bear the burdens of proof and
economic loss from their injuries prior to judgment and/or settlement. I
attribute some of this injustice to the legal system's failure to attend
openly to the power inequalities between mass tort victims and corporate
harm-causers. The tort system must assess and compensate for power
differentials between parties to mass tort litigation. Relying on feminist
theory to understand what power-equalizing or power-balancing might
mean, and also to reinterpret disempowering legal rhetoric such as
"equality before the law," I suggest that because courts are invested with
the state's authority to mete out justice, courts are warranted in balancing or leveling the power between parties in litigation settings. I propose
that courts change the current legal presumptions that inappropriately
place both the initial economic loss and the burden of proof on a party
injured by a large corporate enterprise pursuing private benefits. Courts
should allocate burdens and presumptions in a manner that would empower previously unprivileged parties and make it a fairer contest between disputants in court.
In Part IV, I recommend a reconceptualization of responsibility in
tort, and particularly in mass tort law. The new meaning of legal responsibility that I propose is grounded in feminist theories' concepts of care,
response, and interdependency. Accordingly, monetary payments to injured parties ought not fulfill legal responsibilities. We must turn our
attention to the crafting of remedies that meet the needs of mass tort
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victims and that require harm-causers to satisfy their responsibilities by
doing interpersonal caregiving tasks.15
My underlying goal is to urge a paradigm shift in how the legal
system values and responds to injured human beings; to examine how
laws implement our values of health, safety, human relationships, and
well-being; to demonstrate how the judicial system can empower all of us
(not just a privileged few); and to scrutinize how the legal system deals
with large, for-profit corporate entities. Anecdotal evidence and my personal experiences convince me that in the face of a real, immutable
choice, most human beings value their own and their family's health,
safety, interpersonal relationships, and environment more than they
value accumulated wealth, convenience, and the business climate.' 6 Yet
tort law and our legal system, by responding in a language of dollars,
efficiency, and economic progress, implicitly privileges economic ends
over relationships, environment, safety, and human health. It is not surprising that a system which deviates so significantly from our basic
human needs and values is in crisis. Before we can solve the liability
crisis, we must make our legal system consistent with our chosen personal values and priorities. We err if we maintain two sets of valuesone for our personal relationships and one for our activities in the business world. This Article is an explicit moral and political challenge to
our legal system and its participants. It is a call for each of us to take
more personal responsibility for one another, our actions and decisions,
values, justice system, and forms of social, political, and economic
organization.
I. BLAMING THE VIcTIM: FAULTING COMMON LAW TORT AND
TORT PLAINTIFFS FOR THE LIABILITY CRISIS

Criticisms of the tort system abound. 17 Tort plaintiffs are criticized
for their greed and litigiousness in seeking exorbitant recoveries and for
15. For a synopsis of the ideas in Parts HI and IV, see Leslie Bender, Changingthe Values in
Tort Law, 25 TULSA L.J. 759 (1990).
16. The frequency and ways in which people opt for health and safety risks and make choices
about personal risk-taking may tell us more about human incapacity to understand or imagine one's
own vulnerability to serious injury or death than about autonomy and free choice. A decision to rely
on luck to avoid injury is not the same as a decision to accept the risk or the injury itself.
17. For some general critiques of the current model of mass tort litigation, see KENNETH
ABRAHAM, DIsTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986) [hereinafter K. ABRAHAM, DIRiBUTriNG RISK]; PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3-18 (1988) [hereinafter P. HUBER, LIABILrY]; STEPHEN SUGARMAN,
DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS,
CONSUMERS, AND BUSINEsS (1989) [hereinafter S. SUGARMAN, PERSONAL INJURY LAW]; Kenneth
Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 942 (1988)
[hereinafter Abraham, EnvironmentalLiability]; Kenneth Feinberg, The Toxic Tort Litigation Crisis:
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incapacitating the civil justice system by too many lawsuits.1 8 Juries are
criticized for awarding excessive, inappropriate, and inconsistent verConceptualProblemsand ProposedSolutions, 24 Hous. L. REV. 155 (1987); Peter Huber, Safety and
the Second Best: The Hazardsof Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277
(1985) [hereinafter Huber, Second Best]; George Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern
Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987); Alvin Rubin, Mass Torts and LitigationDisasters, 20 GA. L.
REV. 429 (1986). Some tort scholars caution against discarding our tort system for mass torts. See,
e.g., Jean Love, Actions for Non-PhysicalHarn: The Relationship Between the Tort System and NoFaultCompensation (With an Emphasison Worker's Compensation), 73 CALIF. L. REV. 857 (1985);
Robert Rabin, EnvironmentalLiability and the Tort System, 24 Hous. L. REV. 27 (1987).
Much of the criticism of common law tort has followed the law's attempts to contend with
problems of products liability, mass torts, and toxic torts. These problems seem to defy the capacity
of the legal system to respond: the number of victims are astounding and their locations widespread;
the kinds of harms are often of a different nature from isolated, single-event incidents of negligence
(such as car accidents) in that they exhibit long latency periods and pose the threat of inter-generational harms; defendants often are intricate, nearly impenetrable organizational structures; the science and technology involved in causing these harms and attributing harms to these causes is
enormously complex; and the burdens on the judicial system and delays in completing the litigation
process are unfathomable. This list is far from exhaustive, but certainly representative.
18. Empirical studies of case filings indicate that there has been a substantial increase in products liability and tort cases, but evidence shows that most of the increase is due to the extraordinary
number of lawsuits in a handful of cases of corporate mass torts, such as those torts caused by
asbestos, Dalkon Shield, DES, Bendectin, and Agent Orange. Approximately 24,000 claimants had
filed lawsuits for asbestos-related injuries as of March 1983, and there are estimates that within 30
years there will be about 200,000 more. JAmEs KAKALIx, PATRICIA EBENER, WILLIAM FELSTINER, Gus HAGOSTROM & MICHAEL SHANLEY, VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND ExPSEss 3-4 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice, R-3042-ICJ, 1984) [hereinafter J.
KAKALIK, ASBESTOS LITIGATION]. A subsequent Rand Report claimed that there were already at
least 87,000 asbestos plaintiffs in state and federal courts and that new claims are being filed at a rate
of 1,300 per month. MARK PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS: TOWARD
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIvE PROCEDURES 5 & n.10 (Rand Institute for
Civil Justice, N-2805-ICY, 1988). Dalkon Shield cases are estimated at 325,000; Agent Orange at
250,000, and DES at 1000. Id. at 6. Merrill Dow attorney Alfred Schretter estimates that 1,925
Bendectin claims have been filed world-wide. Rorie Sherman, Bendectin Claims Run Into a Wall,
Nat'l L.J., I May 7, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
How can we attribute this phenomenon to the injured victims when the real problem is that
there are so many people who are injured by one product or one corporation? If those products had
injured only one person each, then we would not claim those single victims were overly litigious for
bringing lawsuits to recover for their injuries.
Complaints about litigiousness and excessive verdicts are suspect because many victims of tortious conduct do not sue at all. Richard Abel, The Real Tort Crisis--Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 448-52 (1987) [hereinafter Abel, Too Few Claims] (empirical analysis indicating many injuries
fail to claim). See also PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 18-29 (1985) (discussing infrequency of medical malpractice claims in relation to
injuries inflicted by negligent medical care); Marc Galanter, Beyond the Litigation Panic, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN LLsmrY LAW 18-30 (W. Olson ed. 1988). Kristin Bumiller notes that only a few
people who believe they have experienced illegal discrimination based on "race, age, sex, handicaps,
union membership, or other things" ever pursue a legal remedy at all. KRISrIN BUMILLER, TE
CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY 26 (1988). She attributes this to an ideology of victimization that legitimizes
the "victim's" own defeat. Id at 28-29. Bumiller notes that victims of discrimination "feel that
asserting their legal rights would not enable them to express their sense of dignity but would force
them to justify their worthiness against a more powerful opponent." Id. at 109. Perhaps mass tort
victims feel the same way.
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dicts. t 9 Critics bemoan that joint liability has been wrongfully employed
to help plaintiffs find deep pockets or to impose a regime of collective
20
guilt, which counters our ethic of individualism and responsibility.

Some critics claim that causation doctrine has been distorted to impose
liability in situations in which there is no clear connection between the
injury and the harm.2 1 Other critics blame the evolution of tort law (e.g.,
Many plaintiffs settle their cases for undisclosed amounts or small amounts per victim. For
example, although the Agent Orange litigation ended with a $180 million settlement, it is estimated
that each long-term disabled veteran will get only an average of $5700 and the average survivor's
benefit will be $1800. Robert Rabin, Tort System on TriaL The Burden ofMass Toxics Litigation, 98
YALE L.J. 813, 818 (1989). One commentator relates, a "woman testified that the damage to her
daughter alone would amount to approximately $6.6 million, thus leading her to remark that, 'I
realize that we are in need of a miracle of the loaves and fishes if we only have $180 million."'
Michael Riccuili, Equity and Accountability in the Reform of Settlement Proceduresin Mass Tort
Cases: The EthicalDuty to Consult 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 817, ,859(1988) (quoting In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 768 (1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988)).
Certainly there are exceptional cases where the verdicts do seem outlandish or highly inconsistent, but those unique and relatively rare cases have been presented and prostituted by the media and
tort critics in their lobbying for tort reform as normal and predictable results of our current tort
rules. Abel, Too Few Claims, supr at 445.
19. For a discussion of excessive and unnecessary compensations in tort claims, see S.
SUGARMAN, PERSONAL INjURY LAW, supra note 17, at 37-39. If mass tort verdicts are disproportionately high (which is arguable), then there must be a reason. Defendants and their attorneys are
afforded fair and ample opportunities to argue to juries about just resolutions and amounts of recovery. Perhaps jury decisions in favor of plaintiffs and the amounts of recovery reflect a sense of social
outrage at the injustices and unconsented risks suffered by mass tort victims, or compassion for those
who bear these heinous injuries as losers in a utilitarian calculation not of their own making. If
something about the kinds, circumstances, and extent of these harms evokes these responses from
juries, then we should listen to that message rather than try to eliminate their response. If juries
award punitive damages, then it is because they recognize the appropriateness of punishment. Corporate defendants argue that they cannot survive when subjected to these multiple lawsuits and high
verdicts. A solution to multiple, large verdicts against corporate defendants is to stop corporations
from causing mass harms, rather than preventing juries from doing what they can to remedy injustices they perceive.
20. See, eg., Abraham, Dilemma of Mass Tor4 supra note 4, at 847 (traditional concepts of
individual responsibility are being called into question by conceptions that overlook differences between individual parties and thereby promote more collective forms of responsibility). Blaming tort
law for the development of new joint and several liability theories that have adapted to changing
realities of how corporations conduct business in this country is also inappropriate. In a society of
mass production, mass distribution, mass marketing, and relatively fungible products (or at least
products creating relatively fungible risks to the public), liability rules ought to reflect reality. Tort
law's ability to respond to these changes in our society is reason for praise, not condemnation. If we
do not like our economic organization and material production, then we ought to change them,
rather than condemn tort law.
21. See, eg., P. HUBER, LW~manY, supra note 17, at 16. In wrestling with wide-spread harms,
unusual configurations of causal information, and blurred identities of harm-causing corporate entities, courts have proposed alternative methods for proving causation and attributing liability. These
theories include: 1) market share liability and alternative liability, see Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, 73
N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989); 2) weak preponderance of evidence standards, see In re Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. 740, 833-39 (E.D.N.Y.
1984); and 3) substantial factor tests, see Elam v. Alcolac, 765 S.W.2d 42, 175-85 (Mo. Ct. App.
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discovery rules that extend the limitations periods, strict liability for
products and abnormally dangerous activities, alterations in proof of causation) for the unavailability of liability insurance.22 Transaction costsattorneys' fees, litigation and administrative expenses-often exceed the
compensation that goes to injured plaintiffs. 23 Judges are criticized for
1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 69 (1989). For theories of environmental or ecological causes based on
epidemiological studies and statistical probabilities, see Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F.
Supp. 303, 321-22 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
Vicarious corporate responsibility for mass harms represents more than a search for the deep
pocket. Theories of vicarious corporate responsibility acknowledge the relationship between the
power to control and decide, and the harms caused by facilities or persons subordinated to that
power. Joint liability imposed on corporations in the DES litigation context reflects a community
sense of collective corporate responsibility, when products by different corporate producers create
very similar risks and harms. In this way, tort law gradually is adapting to circumstances of indeterminate defendants and indeterminate plaintiffs. These changes include newer uses of statistics,
probability theory, and different burdens of proof and persuasion that correlate with the kinds of
harms and risks that corporations have created and imposed on the public. Tort law expansion
indicates a belief that corporations should not be able to relieve themselves of liability just because
our level of scientific sophistication does not allow us to articulate the causal connection between
actual harms and corporate-imposed risks in the same manner that we can for car accidents or slipand-fall cases. In many ways we are searching for a new paradigm of legal cause for mass, toxic, and
corporate harms comparable to the change in physics from Newton to Einstein to Heisenberg.
22. See eg., Abraham, EnvironmentalLiability, supra note 17, at 955-56 (expansion of environmental tort liability will place enormous burdens upon insurance underwriters and reduce availability of insurance); Priest, supra note 17, at 1538-39 (expansion of modem tort liability has led to
the reduction of insurance availability).
23. For critiques of excessive transaction cost, see ELI BERNZWEIG, BY ACCIDENT, NOT DESIGN: THE CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE INJURY REPARATIONS (1980); DEBORAH HENSLER, WILLIAM FELSTINER, MOLLY SELVIN & PATRICIA EBENER, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE

CHALLENGE OF MASS ToxIc TORTS (Rand Corp. Study, R-3324-ICJ, 1985); J. KAKALIK, ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra note 18; JAMES KAKALIK & NICHOLAS PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION
PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (Rand Corp. Study, R-3391-ICJ, 1986); JAMES KAKALIK & ABBY
ROBYN, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDITURES FOR PROCESSING TORT

CASES (Rand Corp. Study, R-2888-ICJ, 1982); JAMES KAKALIK & RANDY Ross, COSTS OF THE
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDITURES FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF CIVIL CASES (Rand
Corp. Study, R-2985-ICJ, 1983); Stephen Sugarman, Doing.Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
555 (1985) [hereinafter Sugarman, Tort Law].
The breakdown of the transaction cost statistics in tort litigation is astounding. According to
one study:
In 1985, the total expenditure nationwide for tort litigation terminated in state and federal
courts of general jurisdiction was between $29 and $36 billion. This accounts for approximately 92 percent of all compensation paid in tort litigation. Of that total, $16 to $19
billion was spent for the various costs of the tort litigation system, not including the net
compensation paid to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were paid $21 to $25 billion in total compensation. After deducting their legal fees and expenses, which on average amount to about 30
percent of the total compensation, and the value of their time, they netted $14 to $16
billion in compensation. Defendants' legal fees and expenses totaled about $4.7 to $5.7
billion.
DEBORAH HENSLER, MARY VAANA, JAMES KAKALIK & MARK PETERSON, TRENDS IN TORT
LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 26 (Rand Corp. Study, R-3583-ICJ, 1987) (footnotes omitted). Many people justifiably would argue that too large a part of the enormous expense of
tort litigation is the fee paid to lawyers. A Rand Report about the cost of civil litigation revealed
that 57% of the expenses of litigation in non-auto tort litigation are for expenses other than plaintiff
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legislating or exceeding their judicial roles when they innovate to find
just resolutions of grievous mass tort harms.24 There are criticisms that
the utilization of strict liability in mass torts is coercive and operates as
an unjust tax. 25 Critics argue that the nexus between tort law and its
traditionally expressed goals is threadbare. 26 Many of these critics, at a
minimum, imply that common law tort rules and verdicts cause and continue to perpetuate these problems. They further imply that these rules
and verdicts have created the perceived liability crisis.
Like mass tort victims and common law tort itself, rape and domestic violence victims often are blamed for the injuries they suffer-they did
something wrong or did not say "no" loudly or frequently enough. 27
Rape and domestic battering are legally constructed as private disputes
between two parties, rather than as social and political problems. Rape
is about male violence, domination, sexuality, and cultural, social, and
political conditions of sexism. Analogously, mass torts are not private
disputes. Mass torts are about corporate violence, power, irresponsibility, and cultural, social, and political conditions that ultimately prioritize
wealth and production over human welfare. Blaming common law tort
for the liability crisis is like blaming women for being raped.28 We must
compensation. Hensler, supra note 4, at 493 (pie chart illustrating allocation of non-auto tort litigation expenditures in 1985).
24. For an account of the criticisms of Chief Justice Rose Bird, Justices Grodin, and Reynoso
of the California Supreme Court for their innovations in products liability, see Sugarman, Taking
Advantage, supra note 11, at 338 n.52. Ethics complaints were filed against Chief Judge Miles Lord
in the Dalkon Shield Litigation. See In re A.H. Robins, JCP 84-001 and JCP 84-002 (8th Cir.
Judicial Council, Dec. 26, 1984); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1190 (8th Cir. 1984).
For criticisms of Judge Jack Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation, see PETER SCHUCK, AGENT
ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURT 160-61, 222-23 (1987).
25. See P. HUBER, LIABLnY, supra note 17, at 3-18.
26. See S. SUGARMAN, PERSONAL INJURY LAW, supra note 17, at 3-74.
27. See MENACHEM AMR, PATTERNlS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 259-76 (1971) ("victim-precipitated
rape"); SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 312 (1975); ROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAW 102 (1984); Christine Littleton, Women's Experience
and the Problem of Transition: Perspectiveson Male Batteringof Women, 1989 U. CHI. L. F. 23, 2829. I recognize that my analogy to rape is a bit strained. I argue that both tort law and tort victims
are "victims" in the sense that they are blamed for the liability crisis; in contrast, I argue that only
rape victims (and not rape laws) are blamed for the harms done to them. Tort critics blame both the
victims and the legal rules that permit suing for damages for a crisis in the judicial, insurance, and
business systems. Because of the manner in which the critics have constructed the problem, it is
necessary to include both injured persons and tort law in the category of "victim." Rape laws, in
contrast, are not generally blamed for the initial harm that rape victims suffer, although it is recognized that the construction of rape law and requirements for proof of a rape case can add to the
harm that rape survivors suffer by causing them to be "raped" a second time by the legal system.
See CATHARINE MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:

DiscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW 82

(1987).
28. For an example of blaming rape victims, see, e.g., Rape Guilty Plea,After Acquittal, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 7, 1989, at B21, col. 6 (quoting Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida jury foreman
as saying, "We all feel she asked for it the way she was dressed").
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focus on eradicating male violence and correcting sexism to eliminate
rape; likewise, we must focus on abolishing corporate violence and revis29
ing corporate organization and power to eliminate mass torts.
Suspending the availability of tort remedies and tort law for victims
of mass torts would only exacerbate the problems.3 0 It would be like
eliminating women's ability to charge men with rape. The needs of the
victims for justice, recognition of their harms, empowerment, retribution,
and compassionate responses from the community would not be met by
closing off access to courts, even if there is a substitution of an administrative compensation system. 31 Nor would there be an adequate check
on a corporation's freedom to impose undemocratic risks on others so
long as it could provide "compensation." Courts and the common law
can serve important roles in tempering abuses of corporate power. We
need a solution to the liability crisis that will put an end to allowing
corporations to impair health or safety in exchange for advancing economic well-being or by paying monetary damages.
There can be little doubt about the parallels between the relationships of power that privilege men in the law of rape, (and blame the
victim for her own injuries), and those power relations that privilege corporations (and blame victims for injuries or the problems created for the
"business climate" when pursuing legal remedies for their injuries). In
both cases, men and corporations have had more power than their "vic29. For just a few examples of corporate conduct and violence that have led to mass tort or
toxic harms, see Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) ('state of the art"
chemical plant with environmental controls managed by uneducated janitor and cost-based rejections of necessary environmental improvements causing physical injuries and chemically-induced
immune deficiencies in neighbors), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 69 (1989); PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985) (exposure to asbestos manufactured by Johs-Manville leading to asbestosis, mesothelioma and lung cancers); Matt Tallmer,
Chemical Dumping as a Corporate Way of Life, in CORPORATE VIOLENCE: INJURY AND DEATH
FOR PROFrT 111 (S.
Hills ed. 1987) (Love Canal, Occidental Chemical Company at Lathrop, California; Bloody Run Creek, New York; Bethpage and Hicksville, Long Island; and more); Miles Lord,
The Dalkon Shield Litigation: Revised Annotated Reprimandby Chief Judge Miles W. Lord, 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 7 (1986) (A.H. Robins IUD with defectively designed tail-string that caused deaths,
abortions, injured infants, infertility, pelvic inflammatory disease and other injuries). For similar
accounts, see STUART HILLS, CORPORATE VIOLENCE: INJURY AND DEATH FOR PROFIT (1987).
30. Many critics have sought various kinds of administrative compensation schemes in lieu of
common law tort remedies for mass tort victims. See S. SUGARMAN, PERSONAL INJURY LAw,
supra note 17; Troyen Brennan, CausalChains and StatisticalLinks. The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-SubstanceLitigation, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 469 (1988); Kenneth Feinberg, The
Toxic Tort Litigation Crisis: Conceptual Problems and ProposedSolutions, 24 Hous. L. REv. 155
(1987); William Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liabilityfor Toxic Tort" A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv.859 (1981); Jeffrey Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts" Relieving Legal, Scientific and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
177 (1983).
31. See, eg., Stanley Ingber, Rethinking IntangibleInjuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L.
1Ev. 772, 772 (1985) (discussing needs of victims).
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tims" to influence the structure, analyses, categories, and definitions used
by the legal system to define and resolve disputes. In both cases, powerful men and corporations have influenced the legal system and cultural
understandings to try to prevent women and injured persons from holding them publicly responsible for the consequences of their rapes and
corporate, profit-motivated harms.
When critics assail the tort system, they are blaming the tort system
for consequences more correctly attributed to the enormous quantities of
harm caused by corporate violence and corporate risk-imposition. No
wonder the legal system's back is breaking under this additional
weight. 32 There are many problems with the common law tort system
and we may be in the throes of a "liability crisis," but the tort critics'
focus is misplaced. The problems are not rooted in our tort system, but
merely reflected by it. The source of the "liability crisis" lies in our economic and value structures.
First, in the name of economic efficiency, progress, and advanced
technology, we have licensed-intentionally or inattentively-massive
corporate organizations that are as great in size, wealth, and power as
nation-states. Yet we permit them to function without the power checks
33
ordinarily imposed on our traditional, collective political institutions.
32. The common law tort system originally developed to resolve problems between two persons, a plaintiff and a defendant, who collided in the course of their daily living. Our collective
experiences taught us that this model proved woefully inadequate in certain situations. This inadequacy was particularly apparent in the business or work world, where injuries were an accepted price
for advanced industry and "progress." Despite our social-political decision to substitute statutory
workers' compensation programs for negligence actions, the model of individuals colliding has been
retained, for the most part, as the pattern for products liability, toxic and mass tort litigation.
One of the problems of common law tort is that it equates the rules and problem-solving mechanisms designed to settle car-accident type events with mass torts situations that involve risks and
harms to many victims-risks that are caused by complex organizations in pursuit of commercial
advantage. These events are too different to be treated alike. Courts have developed alternative
theories to respond to the unique nature of products liability and mass harms, but these theories
have been blamed for the "liability crisis." See, eg., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,
611-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145-46 (development of market-share liability
theory), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d
443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38 (1978) (altering burdens of proof to compensate for disparities in the accessibility of information about design defects); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962) (developing strict liability in tort for
defective products); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods., 90 N.J. 191, 201, 447 A.2d 539, 545 (1982)
(refusing to permit a "state-of-the-art" defense in strict products liability claim).
33. In the United States, we claim to believe in direct democratic participation or at least representative democracy. One tenet of this political ideology is that our government processes and decisionmaking are open to public scrutiny. We could probably solve some of the liability crisis if, in
accord with our ideological tenets of government, we open the bellies of large organizational beasts
to expose to the public any and all of the information about risks, experiments, research, development, complaints, and harms-information that is now hidden and in corporations' exclusive control. Mass harms are attributable in part to the secrecy and inaccessibility of corporate information
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The enormous range of harms that large corporate entities cause directly

correlates with the power of corporations to coordinate their workforce
and their ability to mass produce and mass distribute products.3 4 The
seeds of the liability crisis can be found in the law's protection of corporations' ability to impose risks, not the law's response to tort victims.
Second, the liability crisis has grown out of a misapplied value sys-

tem that wins our consent by claiming to prefer values of safety, health,
and life over property, but ultimately prioritizes efficiency and progress.

Despite our legal system's rhetorical endorsement of safety, health, and
human dignity, human injuries and deaths are translated into economic
values to be calculated in determining policies and preferred legal principles. We rely on our articulated values to prevent these harms from happening in the first instance. When harms do occur-and we find that we
are not protected as we thought we were-we again rely on the prioritized values of health, safety, and human dignity to give us fair remedies
through the legal process. This gap between our ideological beliefs and
our practices stimulate6 the liability crisis.
and the absence of a public voice in the intelligent assessment of risks. For evidence of concealed
information and dilatory and deceptive discovery practices by corporate defendants in mass torts
cases, see RUSSELL MOKHIBER, CORPORATE CRIME AND VIOLENCE 277-87 (1988). Mokhiber cites
Johns-Manville's policy of refusing to advise workers of asbestos related risks as one example of
corporate concealment. According to Johns-Manville's medical director, Kenneth Smith,
[A]s long as the man is not disabled, it is felt that he should not be told of his condition so
that he can live and work in peace and the Company can benefit by his many years of
experience. Should the man be told of his condition today, there is a very definite possibility that he would become mentally and physically ill, simply through the knowledge that
he has asbestosis.
Id. at 283-84. See also Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388 (Ist Cir.) (affirming district
court's finding of "overwhelming evidence" of discovery misconduct during the Anderson v. W.R.
Grace litigation), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 233 (1990); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods., 493 F.2d
1076, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973) (relationship between asbestos and lung disease established more than
sixty years ago, yet management gave little or no warnings to employees), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974); SHELDON ENGELMAYER & ROBERT WAGMAN, LORD'S JUSTICE (1985); MORTON MINTZ,
AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985); Lord, supra note
29, at 10 (corporation suppressed information about harms from multifilamented tailstring and
delayed recall).
34. Without the collective actions of members of the corporate enterprise working together,
mass harms would not follow. Individuals working alone cannot usually cause the magnitude of
destruction, risk, and harm that corporations cause by combining the planning, strategies, energies,
and work of many employees. See M. PETERSON & M. SELVIN, supra note 18, at 3-12 (discussing
several examples of mass accidents and problems in ensuing litigation). Sometimes the collective
activity goes beyond a single corporation to multiple corporations acting in parallel to produce fungible or relatively generic products. See, eg., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740
(E.D. N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.) (producers of seven major chemical company producers of Agent Orange were mixed together before being applied in Vietnam), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1004 (1987); Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 608 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (over
200 producers of diethylstilbestrol), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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Third, I also claim that our legal system interprets justice as monetary compensation for harms (achieved through win/lose resolutions of
rights conflicts). This limited notion of justice has also precipitated the
liability crisis. A richer construct of justice would include compassion,
caring, and responses to particularized injured victims' needs, and would
grow out of principles of substantive equality before the law. Our civil
justice system articulates a concern for mass tort victims and equality,
but that rhetoric is often shallow or trumped by the structure of the legal
system that privileges corporations in the litigation- arena. A corporation's privileges are reflected in many ways-presumptive non-liability,
access to legal services, familiarity with the system, political wealth and
power-but I am particularly interested in the placement of presumptions and burdens of proof. The liability crisis is partially a function of
how our legal system fails to respond to power differences between parties in litigation, not a function of anything peculiar to common law tort
that can be eradicated through tort reform legislation or statutory compensation systems.
Fourth, the liability crisis results from our legal system's inconsistency in holding corporate decisionmakers legally responsible for corporate harms 35 and, more importantly, its failure to make corporate actors
personally responsible in a caregiving way 36 for the harms they have created through their corporate actions. This again is a problem with our
legal and political structure that permits massive, private, for-profit corporate enterprises to insulate individuals from personal responsibility for
their decisions and conduct, not a problem with common law tort.
And last, but not least, we have failed to create adequate public forums, other than tort lawsuits in courtrooms, for citizens to express their
35. The collective activity within a corporation works to buffer individuals from individual
responsibility for imposed risks and harms. See MEiR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986); CHRISTOPHER STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 111-18 (1975); Kath-

leen Brickey, Rethinking CorporateLiability Under the Model Penal Code 19 RUTGERS L.J. 593
(1988); John Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick" An Unscandalized Inquiry into the

Problem of CorporatePunishment,79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 393-400 (1981); Eliezer Lederman, CriminalLaw, Perpetratorand Corporation Rethinking a Complex Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 285 (1985); Michael Metzger, Organizationsand the Law, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 407, 410 (1987);
Christopher Stone, The Place of EnterpriseLiability in the Control of CorporateConduct, 90 YALE
LJ.1, 11-29 (1980). Development of collective, corporate liability is a predictable consequence of a
legal system that permits large, complex, opaque corporate structures to shield individuals from
responsibilities. Complex corporate structures, combined with the phenomenon of liability insurance, tend to shield decisionmakers and corporate actors, as well as shareholders and other persons
who benefit from corporate actions, from any sense of personal responsibility for their acts. Tort law
did not create multi-layered organizational structures that divide tasks into unintegrated, component
parts so that no one (or hardly anyone) knows the full picture of what is being done.
36. See infra Part IV, notes 134-76 and accompanying text.
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outrage at the injurious imposition of unconsented-to risks. Only in the
courtroom can citizens officially and publicly call corporations and their
officials to answer for their actions, prevent corporate harm-causers from
evading public government criticism and lawsuits, expose corporate decisionmaking and publicly reprimand corporations and their decisionmakers for the harms they cause. Only in the courtroom do we
acknowledge and reinstate the dignity, respect, and autonomy of the injured victims in a public way. Tort litigation provides a place for victims
to tell their stories to the public and make the perpetrators listen. Tort
law theoretically empowers injured victims to act, when the government
does not protect their health and safety. We should not blame injured
victims for utilizing the tort system as this kind of public forum, nor fault
the tort system for providing it. We should praise common law tort for
its tenacity, particularly in an era of bad press, lax regulatory agencies,
and minimal criminal sanctions. The failures here are in the background
political and legal systems, not in common law tort or with its victims.
The "liability crisis" is a symptom of a systemic disease in our body
politic. Common law tort has been construed wrongly as the disease,
sustaining our beliefs that if it is surgically removed or treated, then the
body will heal. It is time to correct this serious misattribution of blame
and seek out the appropriate sources for our condemnation. We must
stop the counter-productive blaming of tort law for these symptoms and
examine what elements of our entire legal system and our culture have
caused this "liability crisis."
We should not blame the tort system for responding to the problem
of mass harms when little has been done to stop those harms from occurring. Our legal system permits corporate organizations to impose risks
on others, accumulate limitless wealth, decide policy undemocratically,
and produce and distribute products world-wide. It has given us little
else with which to work. Because we permit these corporate behaviors
and structures, and because we have designed no other way to compensate victims (monetarily or nonmonetarily), we need common law tort.
It compensates, and it provides forums for public debate about the imposition of risks. We need a way to publicly deter harmful conduct, expose
and shame mass harm-causers, and to provide for public debate about
the imposition of these risks by private corporations upon the public.
Tort law may fail to meet all these needs simultaneously, but given the
difficulty of that task, we ought not blame the law. Instead, we should
criticize the social-political system for the burden that, by default, it imposes on the common law tort system.
I certainly am not arguing that common law tort is fine the way it is.
For starters, we could all agree that tort litigation is too expensive and
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slow. In this Article, I suggest basic changes in tort law that might im-

prove some of its flaws. But I oppose critics who call for the abolition of
common law tort and the exclusive substitution of statutory compensa37
tion systems, neo-contractual systems, or ones based on technocracies.
We must preserve the power of injured individuals to resort to the courthouse for relief. While correcting problems with the tort system, we
38
should not throw out the baby with the bath water.
We cannot eliminate rape or domestic violence by blaming the vic-

tim. We must address problems of male violence and the conditions of
our culture that foster male domination. Similarly, we cannot eliminate

the "liability crisis" by blaming tort victims or abolishing tort law. We
must condemn corporate violence and the economic, social, and political
conditions that have permitted corporate domination. The solution is
not to cap damages (economic, non-economic, and punitive), attack jury
verdicts, or eliminate joint and several liability. Nor will a solution be

achieved by returning to a pure fault-based system, antiquated rules of
causation, or proof and definitions of harms developed in a different eco-

nomic and cultural reality. 39 We only can eliminate the liability crisis by
eradicating the conditions for mass harms. If we truly mean that health

and safety are most important, we must not permit them to be part of
any economic calculus toward "progress." They must be non-negotiable.
If these values are our first priority or our first principle, then we really

must begin there and reorganize all else around them. 40 A reorganization of priorities may require us to "bite the bullet" and make difficult

sacrifices, but the synchronization of our values with our practices may
also dissipate the liability crisis.
37. For an example of these critiques, see S. SUGARMAN, PERSONAL INJURY LAW, supra note
17, at 125-210; Richard Epstein, Session One Discussion of Paper By Richard Epstein, University of
Chicago, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2193, 2223, 2227 (1989) (discussion of PETER HUBER, THE UNINTENDED REVOLUTION IN PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW (1988)); Huber, Second Best, supra note 17, at
329-35 (1985); Priest, supra note 17, at 1587-90. See also Peter Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The
Flawed Promise of Neo-Contract, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1177 (1990) (critiquing neocontractual
analysis).
38. For a similar use of this metaphor with respect to proposed alterations in joint tortfeasor
liability, see Richard Wright, Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater: A Reply to Professor Twerski, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. Rv. 1147 (1989); Aaron Twerski, The Baby Swallowed the Bathwater: A
Rejoinder to Professor Wright, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1161 (1989).
39. But see Epstein, supra note 37, at 2220-22; Peter Huber, FlypaperContractsand the Genesis
of Modern Tort, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2263, 2287 (1989).
40. The typical response is that if we were forced to choose, then we would not really want to
give up our convenience for safety or improved health. There may be some truth to that if we do not
understand the risks to our health (individual, collective, and environmental) as immediate and certain (rather than escapable through luck), and if we do not believe that there can be real change.
When those factors are accounted for, what we might potentially lose in convenience and "progress"
might be gained in improved life and health expectancies.
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GENERAL PROBLEMS OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM THAT FUEL THE
LIABILIYY CRisis

Rather than blame common law tort or tort plaintiffs for the liability
crisis, I suggest that we analyze the aspects of our legal system that contribute to mass tort problems. The legal system's false dichotomies of
public/private and individual/collective fuel the liability crisis by ignoring the unique nature of corporate activities, decisionmaking, and riskimposition that generate mass harms. These dichotomous ways of viewing the world fail to capture the character of corporate actions, and they
impede our thinking about ways the legal system can prevent the mass
harms that corporations cause. We must formulate new categories for
our legal analysis and end the commodification ofjustice and responsibility that fans the flames of the liability crisis.
A. Some False Dichotomies: Public/Privateand Individual/Collective

Early in law school, students learn to distinguish between criminal
law, which is public law designed to protect society's interests, and tort
law, which is private civil law designed to compensate individuals
wrongly injured by another's conduct. 4 1 Even if this dichotomous understanding was appropriate when negligence and personal injury law first
developed, the public/private distinction does not make sense for a legal
system in a society in which large corporate enterprises, pursuing private
gain, impose risks on the general public and make social utility decisions
affecting the public at large without public representation.
41. For an overview of the distinction between public law and private law, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 15-20
(1989). Some commentators have suggested that mass tort might be the appropriate place to bridge
the concepts. David Rosenberg, The CausalConnection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 924-29 (1984). I think it is particularly ironic how
many different pairs of meanings have been attributed to the words "public" and "private." The
public/private distinction, as used in law, uses the label "public" to refer to the government and
"private" to refer to the market and individual business relations. But the same market that is
labeled "private" in the split between public law and private law is called "public" in the split
between public and private spheres of activities in which the law/business/market are public and the
home is private. See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HAZv. L. REv. 1497, 1501 (1983). In addition, we have more common meanings of
"public" and "private" that infiltrate our language. "Public" also has a meaning that connotes
groups of people-as in "the public." "Private," on the other hand, seems to involve only an individual or a couple of individuals interacting. Disregard for this third set of meanings for "public"
and "private" has complicated the law of mass tort. Mass tort actions with corporate defendants
straddle the fence of public and private and require new categories.
If we continue to use the public/private distinction in law-which we probably will at least
until some real transformations occur-mass torts must be considered public because they involve
the public as a non-differentiated group of people and involve activities and conduct that affect the
public sphere (business/market/law).
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When mass harms are caused by products or activities-such as asbestos, chemical production, hazardous waste disposal, nuclear power,
atomic testing, contraceptives and bio-technologies, and environmental/
human disasters-the ensuing legal battles cannot be conceived of as
purely private law disputes, even though they do not fit neatly into the
class of disputes resolved by public law. Mass tort disputes are not public in the traditional sense that a governmental body is involved in regulation, control, or in the litigation. Nor are they public in the traditional
sense that a public official is authorized to bring suit and to represent
society in the vindication of its values or interests. On the other hand,
these disputes are not private in their scope of harm or numbers of "victims," their implications about power and decisionmaking in our society,
their repercussions as precedents in the legal system, or in their capacities
as metaphors for our society. Their names have become symbols of public, social catastrophes-they belong to all of us and represent all of us.4 2
Criminal law is public law because it responds to public harms 43 and
provides remedies for society in general. Traditionally, we have regarded
tort law as private law because it seeks judicial remedies for particular
victims,44 rather than for our society in general.4 5 Damages in mass tort
actions are paid to plaintiffs or victims, not to the state as fines. Mass

tort plaintiffs, rather than the state, decide whether to initiate legal action, how to construct the case, what to claim, whom to sue, whether to

settle, and whether to continue. But the label "private law" is solely
42. Professor Leon Green made a similar observation about tort law thirty years ago. Leon
Green, Tort Law, PublicLaw in Disguise (pts. 1 & 2), 38 Tx. L. REv. 1, 257 (1959-1960).
43. Experience and intuition convince me that mass torts are public harms, to people, to the
community, to the economy, in every way that crime is a public harm. Yet placing the tortfeasors
(the corporate management and entrepreneurs, the research and development scientists, the design,
safety and environmental engineers, the sales forces, and marketing experts) in jail as criminals-even if we could locate the responsible parties-would not suffice. Criminal sanctions against corporate officers would not fully remedy the harms because we would still have to respond to the physical, emotional, and interpersonal losses or "costs" inflicted upon particular individuals, and the
continued, dangerous decisionmaking potential of the errant corporation. Corporate officers or actors are replaceable, yet the corporation lives in perpetuity beyond its connection to particular people. Nor would taking monetary resources from the corporation as tort damages remedy the
problem because corporations can buy insurance to cover these losses or can file for reorganization in
bankruptcy if they have created excessive harms. Se eg., In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 Bankr. 742
(E.D. Va. 1988); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 91 Bankr. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
44. Criminal punishments also provide "private law" relief by exhibiting social concern for the
victim, expressing community outrage at the victim's harm and meeting the victim's need for retribution even though they are classified as "public."
45. As Peter Gabel and Paul Harris said: "One way that the dominant ideology contributes to
alienation and powerlessness is by generating a false distinction between public and private life, a
distinction that translates collective social problems into individual personal matters." Peter Gabel
& Paul Harris, Building PowerandBreaking Images." CriticalLegal Theory and the Practiceof Law,
11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 396 (1982-1983).
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rhetorical because, in fact, mass tort remedies benefit the public as do
criminal punishments. Mass tort remedies arguably deter future impositions of risk, indicate social disapproval, 46 and bear some of the costs for
mass catastrophes that otherwise would be borne by tax dollars.
Private and public law are also distinguished by different requirements about notice and the clarity of standards. Public law standards of
conduct and safety are decided and articulated in advance through legislative enactments and administrative rules and regulations. Specific standards of prohibited conduct in private law are not made explicit in
advance of the choices to act. Criminal law relies on clear rules; private
tort law rests on generalized standards of behavior (like reasonableness).
Ironically, unlike criminal law, much of the corporate conduct that ultimately results in mass harms and tort liability is implicitly encouraged
and respected (mass production, technology development, organizational
growth, expanded markets, cost-benefit assessments, risk-taking, and
capital accumulation), rather than carried on under the shroud of criminal enterprise.
The private law system permits decisions about the imposition of
risks, expenditures of funds, and social utility to be made by private corporations behind closed doors, and then, if harms result and remedies for
those harms are pursued, those decisions may be checked or evaluated
later in open courtrooms by judges and juries. The manner in which we
resolve mass tort conflicts between corporate risk-imposers and members
of the public and whether we understand corporate imposition of risk as
public or private reflect our basic norms and values. Public law is supposed to enforce our publicly decided standards, norms, and values. It
would seem that public norms and values about imposing risk on others
should be subject to public debate and public decisionmaking, rather
than remaining a matter of private, individualized concern. Yet corporate impositions of risk on others are considered private decisions and
governed by private law.
To add to the public/private confusion about corporate behavior
and mass torts, it is hard to categorize the large corporate defendants
appropriately. Corporations are, in some sense, public when their shares
are publicly traded; yet they are private in their management, and distribution and ownership of assets and profits. Many large corporations
own more assets, possess more political and economic bargaining power,
and often employ more people than many public, governmental bodies.
Some multinational corporations are larger in terms of assets, employees,
46. Professor Owen notes that tort law may rectify private wrongs, but it is "often public in its
spirit and effect." David Owen, Deterrenceand Desertin Tort: A Comment, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 665,

667 (1985).
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and shareholders than many countries in the world.4 7 Perhaps there is
something about the size, wealth, power, and numbers of people involved
in large corporations that makes them more public than private, no matter how we have previously characterized them.
Our legal and political construction of the public/private split is incoherent, 48 particularly when we attempt to apply it to mass torts. By
labeling large, publicly traded corporations as "private" and applying
private law, we insulate them from regular and thorough public scrutiny
of their decisionmaking (except with regard to the ways they affect investors) and protect their liberty to act undemocratically in decisions that
affect large groups of people (except with regard to shareholders). We
also accord them "rights" such as free speech,4 9 and unlimited property
ownership and profit accumulation. They are treated as individual
human beings, despite the reality of their increased collective power,
knowledge, capacity for doing damage, and wealth.5 0 Historically, the

label "private" effectively insulated choices and conduct from public
scrutiny or censure.51 Since those entities labeled "private" avoid gov47. See PHILLIP BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE SCOPE
OF CORPORATE POWER 175 (1975); ROBERT STAUFFER, NATION-BUILDING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 12-13 (1973).

48. Many eminent legal scholars carefully have expounded upon the flaws in our legal system's
public/private distinction. See, eg., Kenneth Casebeer, Toward a CriticalJurisprudence-A First
Step by Way of the Public/PrivateDistinctionin ConstitutionalLaw, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379, 422
(1983) ("[T]o nakedly assert that there continues to be a sharp line separating public action and
private action simply demonstrates the total formality or emptiness of the concept of the State or
Sovereign."); David Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 4
(D. Kairys ed. 1982); Karl Klare, The Quest for IndustrialDemocracy and the Struggle Against
Racism: Perspectivesfrom LaborLaw and CivilRights, 61 OR. L. REV. 157, 161 (1982) (weakness of
the fields of labor law and civil rights law due to the distinction between public and private); Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, Liberalism'sPublic/PrivateSplit, TIKKUN, Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 24;

Nadine Taub & Elizabeth Schneider, Perspectiveson Women's Subordination andthe Role of Law, in
THE POLITIcs oF LAW, supra, at 117. See generally Symposium: The Public/PrivateDistinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
49. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).

50. See John Flynn, The Jurisprudenceof CorporatePersonhood: The Misuse of a Legal Concept, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 131, 133 (W. Samuels & A.
Miller eds. 1987). See generally M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 35, at 26-30 (discussing the personification of the corporation and the corresponding rights it enjoys).
51. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 48, at 117. By shrouding the home in the private sphere,
the government provided no recourse for spouse and child abuse. See Olsen, supra note 41, at 1501.
Heterosexual men, as makers of the law, could insulate their conduct in their home from governmental purview by labeling it private. The legal system's labeling corporate decisionmaking as private
allows corporations to insulate their workings from public view. On the other hand, since gay men
have not been empowered to make laws that accommodate their own perspectives, their private
consensual conduct is interpreted as sufficiently public to permit government interference. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-96 (1986). There also is a frightening possibility that women's
decisions about whether to choose to reproduce will be deemed sufficiently public to permit governmental interference on a state-by-state basis. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct.
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ernment control, it is not surprising that powerful corporations have acquired that label for themselves. The public/private distinction is about
politics and power, not a description of reality.
Decisions about imposing risks on the public and the social mechanisms for coping with the harms resulting from those risks are public
questions of the highest order. Today, mass tort actions are semi-public
and semi-private: They borrow from both concepts, but are consistent
with neither. The tort system fails to deal appropriately with mass tort,
in part because it tries to fit itself within this antiquated, artificial dichotomy between public and private law-a wholly inaccurate representation
of experience and material reality that undermines its effectiveness. We
need to recognize that there is no chasm or clear distinction between
public and private that ought to control available methods for understanding corporations and for resolving mass tort.5 2 We need to name a
new category rather than adhere to abstract, reified notions of private
and public. We need the freedom to rethink appropriate rules and remedies in light of the newer contexts and circumstances of the cases, without the prior constraints imposed by classifications of public versus
private entity, or public versus private law, or public versus private harm.
In addition to the fallacy of the public/private dichotomy, the law
makes unrealistic distinctions between the individual and the collective,
particularly with respect to understanding and imposing responsibility
for corporate harms. Our private law system assumes individual players
act as individuals, and individual rights conflicts are resolved by and for
those individuals. Even when the law imposes responsibility on a corporation, it sanctions the corporation as if it were an individual or single
unit whose assets are subject to damage awards or fines, rather than as a
collectivity of people. Notions of collective responsibility only seem clear
in terms of public entities or governmental bodies. For government actions, we acknowledge that a government agency or political entity represents all of us and makes us all responsible to the extent that reparations
for harms come out of public coffers: In other contexts, discussions of
3040, 3058 (1989); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452, 1466 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct.
2926 (1990); Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby, 854 F.2d 852, 868 (6th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990); Turnock v. Ragsdale, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988). Once something

is labeled public, it is subject to regulation and government control. The labels private and public
are not really descriptive but entail significant political consequences.

52. Although Professor Rosenberg is making a different kind of critique, he also recognizes the
fallacy of the public law/private law distinction in mass tort. Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 925. He
concludes that the division between private and public law remedies impedes the just resolution of
very complex cases and he proposes the use of certain traditional public law remedies to resolve mass
tort cases.
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collective responsibility are said to violate some fundamental precepts of
53
our law.
Although the law treats corporations differently from governments
and governmental units, corporate collectivities do not fit neatly into the
private, individualized analysis of harms or responsibility that courts apply. How should the law treat collectives, groups, organizations, or individuals that work together (or who work independently in the same
market) to cause harm? The law should provide separate mechanisms
and new rules to deal with individuals who work together to create
harms and corporations organized for private profit.
We certainly can imagine circumstances in which an individual
could be said to have acted alone in causing a harm, although mass
harms are almost inconceivable in terms of one individual or "person"
acting alone. 54 The magnitude of mass harms results from the combined
actions and decisions of many people acting together to create products
or perform activities. Not only do we permit people to act together in
this manner, we encourage it and shield it from most public interference.
We recognize how people working together in corporations create efficiencies that could not be achieved by people working alone. Now we
also have to recognize how those combinations of people increase their
capacity to do harm and interfere with our ability to determine who is
responsible.
If the dichotomy between individual and collective ever made sense,
which I doubt,55 it is unworkable in our modem era of corporate entities.
Modem corporations are complex, multifaceted, integrated organizations
of people who make far-reaching business decisions that create risks affecting many people. Just as in the public/private dichotomy, the categories of individual and collective also have gotten away from us.
Corporate activity and corporate responsibility are neither individual nor
collective. We need to think of new ways to reconceptualize the experience of corporate activity-how corporate decisions are (and ought to
be) made, and how we should assess the responsibility of people and
groups within and across corporate entities for the harms that result.
53. See Abraham, Dilemma of Mass Tort; supra note 4; see generally INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY (P. French ed. 1972) (using the massacre at My Lai to raise and investigate the moral and legal questions of individual and collective responsibility).
54. Ironically, a corporation often is treated in law as a "person" and for most purposes is
represented as a single person. M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 35, at 27; PETER FRENCH, COLLECTIVE
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 31, 32 (1984); Flynn, supra note 50, at 138-42.
55. Radical feminist theory, for example, begins with a premise of human nature as interconnected and social in the first and final instance and whatever individualism develops in the meantime
is constructed and secondary. See ALISON JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLmcs AND HUMAN NATURE 83118 (1983); Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CI. L. REv. 1, 14 (1988).
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Corporate liability should relate to the harms caused. Personal responsibility ought to be based on power to make decisions about re-

sources, markets, personnel, and safety, as well as power to disclose.
Personal responsibility has to correlate with the power of individuals

within corporate roles.5 6 While the law must protect individuals within
corporations from becoming scapegoats for unlawful corporate actions,
our legal system must try to assign personal responsibility in differing
degrees to all those people who could have intervened and prevented
harms from occurring.5 7 Concomitant with the personal responsibility,

our legal system ought to provide some security to persons who act on
that responsibility.5 8 The laws can be transformed to empower corporate
employees and reduce risk of job loss for preventing corporate harms.

In addition to the confusion created between collective and individual responsibility for corporate-caused harms, we have difficulty applying
the dichotomy of individual/collective to those harmed. We need to develop legal remedies that respond to the harms suffered by the groups of
individuals as well as by the individuals within the groups.5 9 In some
56. The Supreme Court has approved the imposition of strict criminal responsibility on a Chief
Executive Officer of a national retail food chain with 890 facilities and over 30,000 employees for
adulterated food in one of its warehouses under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 331-93 (1988), in United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1975). Criminal liability in
these cases attaches to responsible corporate agents who had the power to prevent or correct the
prohibited conditions.
57. In theory, each individual within the corporation could stop or report a corporation from
causing harm about which he or she knows, but the corporation is the only entity to which "full
knowledge" can usually be attributed. In reality, only people in certain roles have the knowledge or
power to stop the corporation from acting.
58. Even if individual employees have access to adequate information, whistle-blowing statutes
notwithstanding, the decision about whether to report corporate misconduct is a difficult one for
employees who see themselves as powerless to change corporate conduct and who, by reporting
possible wrongdoing, risk loss of their jobs. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765
P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988) (employee fired for reporting to management that his newly
appointed boss was being indicted for crimes against his former company); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 472-73, 427 A.2d 385, 386 (1980) (employee dismissed after reporting to his
employer several state violations including mislabeling of food weight and use of substandard raw
materials); Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 52-68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (attempts by various
engineers to report problems with plant were suppressed or disregarded and critics were fired), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 69 (1989); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.L 58, 62-64, 417 A.2d 505,
507-08 (1980) (scientist employee resigned under pressure for refusing to work on products produced
by employer that she considered unsafe); Murphy v. American Home Prods., 58 N.Y2d 293, 29798, 448 N.E.2d 86, 87, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 233 (1983) (employee fired after reporting to his superiors
the illegal manipulation of company pension plan by high-ranking officers).
59. A harm to a family member is clearly a harm to the family as a group. To call it a harm to
an individual is to remove it from its context and reality, yet to call it a harm to a collective or group
also misses the point. It is one harm that has many facets, affecting the needs of individuals, group3,
and individuals as members of groups. This insight is not only true of families. People are mutually
dependent. If a worker or workers are injured and can no longer work, there is a harm to other
people at the workplace in a real, lived way. And what about harm to one's dear and close friends?
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ways, the law has tried to accommodate this phenomenon by procedural
devices such as class actions and multi-district litigation consolidation,
but these devices do not alter the substantive understandings and categories of thought about victims and tortfeasors as individuals or collectives.
It is probably best with respect to corporate harms to drop the notions of individual and collective entirely. I do not mean that we should
ignore the concerns of each person, or that we should fail to understand
that groups act as single wholes but with greater force. I do mean that
the law must begin from premises that human beings are interconnected
in their lives. The legal system must reconceptualize corporations as social entities consisting of collections of people all working together or
interacting with others inside and outside the corporate group.
Large, publicly traded corporations ought to be a category sui
generis in law. We need separate laws to deal with their organization,
function, and responsibilities. The fact that these mass harms are created
by corporations in the pursuit of private interest, not public benefit, is
particularly important in formulating these laws. Their activities should
not be privileged, but rather should be subject to careful scrutiny and
sensitive appreciation of the interactive nature of people working in
Are the intimacies of close personal relationships and their mutual dependencies invisible to the law?
Our legal system must recognize our mutual dependence. We can hardly imagine an individual
without some intersecting social groups, so that the concept of individual as isolated and capable of
being harmed alone is almost inconceivable. The failings of this reasoning have led courts, lawyers,
and plaintiffs to try to fabricate unique rules and peculiar new causes of action to respond to these
real, lived experiences of harm caused to interrelated members of social and familial groups. These
new causes of action include the following: 1) loss of consortium, see, eg., Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974) (spouses may recover for loss of
the each other's services and consortium); 2) loss of parental society, see eg., Ferriter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980) (children may sue for loss of parental
consortium); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981) (child has independent cause of
action for loss of parental society); Hay v. Medical Center Hosp., 145 Vt. 533, 496 A.2d 939 (1985)
(minor child has right to sue for damages for the loss of parental consortium); 3) loss of comfort and
society of children, see, eg., Ahrenholz v. Hennepin County, 295 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1980) (parents
may be compensated for loss of advice, comfort, assistance and protection which they reasonably
could have expected had the child lived); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975)
(parents may recover damages for loss of aid and society of minor child); 4) negligent infliction of
emotional distress actions brought by "bystanders," see, eg., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441
P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (close relative may recover for emotional distress resulting from
viewing serious negligent injury to child); 5) wrongful birth, see, eg., Berman v. Allan, 80 NJ. 421,
404 A.2d 8 (1979) (parents may recover for emotional distress caused by birth of child with genetic
defects); 6) and others, see, e-g. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (husband can recover for emotional distress suffered as a consequence of wife's
syphilis misdiagnosis).
Although these attempts to shape the law to reflect the experiences of victims and families have
been presented as examples of our overly litigious society, it might be more accurate to understand
them as symptomatic of a cry for the legal system to recognize that we are mutually dependent
beings who suffer along with those victims whose lives are interwoven with our immediate social
units.
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groups. Their special nature also might require that their decisionmaking processes and information be exposed to public observation, or even
that certain kinds of corporate decisions require democratic participation
by people most directly affected. For the legal system to deal appropriately with corporations, mass harms, and the liability crisis, we must
abandon the false dichotomies of public/private and individual/collective. We must create feminist (re)torts.
B.

The Monetization and Commodification of Justice, Responsibilities,
and Injuries

The tort reform and tort law eradication movements rely in large
part on a myth that common law tort rules, particularly in mass tort
60
cases, regularly result in excessive and arbitrary jury verdicts.
Although there are isolated examples of exceptionally large monetary
judgments in individual cases and also of inconsistent verdicts, 6' a fair
argument has been made that those rare judgments are over-publicized
and manipulated by the defense bar and insurance companies, in order to
lobby the public and legislatures for tort law reform. 62 There is no comparable group that lobbies about, or publicizes, all the low or mid-sized
settlements and verdicts in mass tort lawsuits, or the potential cases that
were never brought.63 Nevertheless, accepting the premise that there are
unfitting verdicts (for purposes of argument only), this phenomenon
probably rests on three underlying myths.
The first myth is that injured plaintiffs are money-hungry, and great
sums of money motivate them to sue-which they do too often, too easily, and for too much. Concomitantly, there is a parallel myth that juries
in personal injury actions are swayed by inappropriate sympathies for
injured plaintiffs, resulting in irrational judgments unwarranted by principles ofjustice and fairness. Both these myths attribute to common law
tort the fatal flaw of being a catalyst for greed. The third myth is that
money damages are all our legal system effectively can offer for tort
plaintiffs.
Because our political system does not provide assurances that each
of our injured citizens will have the appropriate health care and money
60.
61.
note 11,
62.

See Sugarman, Tort Law, supra note 23, at 592-96.
See Abel, Too Few Claims, supra note 18, at 443-45; Sugarman, Taking Advantage, supra
at 336-37 & nn. 44-46.
See Abel, Too Few Claims, supra note 18, at 445.

63. This comment is not intended to underestimate the work of Ralph Nader and his colleagues. See Andrew Blum, Back in Vogue?: "Raiders" at 20 Look Forward, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 8,

1990, at 24, col. I (discussing Nader's activism as it relates to the legal system); Ralph Nader, The
Corporate Drive to Restrict Their Victims' Rights, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 15 (1986-87) (praising the
present tort system but encouraging state and federal governments to increase policing activity).
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for necessary living expenses, tort victims are forced to translate part of
their claims for justice into claims for money to pay for' these needs. Furthermore, they may be forced into the tort system when they would prefer not to litigate at all. Even if tort victims have first-party insurance or
health care benefits from other sources, there still may not be compensation for lost wages, lost earning capacity, or other special economic
losses. These unmet needs are a function of distributional injustices in
our political system: If everyone had access to, needed health care and
income maintenance during disability, then tort litigation seeking monetary compensation for these expenses would be unnecessary and superfluous.64 If our polity avoids addressing these systemic, political problems
of health care and income maintenance, they will continue to plague any
justice system we have and will fuel liability crises like the one we presently are experiencing.
In addition to an absence of needed health care and a substituted
income for lost wages while recuperating, we also fail injured citizens in
equally important non-monetary ways. Non-monetary needs of disabled
people include the following needs: affirmation of worth and dignity;
public recognition of the injustices they suffer; desires for sincere, personally conferred apologies; added demands for caretaking services; public
forums to air their grievances; and affirmation that justice and equality
matter in our society. Our legal system cannot continue to ignore the
pain and sacrifices that our political and economic systems have exacted
from our injured members.
As a society we have not taken satisfactory steps to guarantee that
people with disabilities will be respected and cared for in their non-monetary needs. Physical, mental, and psychological disabilities often prevent
citizens from managing or being responsible for ordinary tasks to take
care of themselves and their families. Money can ease the burden, but it
does not assume those particular responsibilities. 6 5 Nor do we have a
system that overtly recognizes that individual victims are members of
social groups and families, and therefore remedies or assistance must
take into account the newly constituted needs and circumstances of tort
66
victims' families and intimate relationships.
64. Several other tort scholars have argued for the need for socialized systems of medical care
and income maintenance. See, eg., Sugarman, Taking Advantage supra note 11, at 358-59; Abel,
Torts in THE POLMCS op LAW, supra note 48, at 185.
65. Although some caretaking services can be purchased if there are adequate financial resources available, many responsibilities have to be provided by families and friends.
66. When I use the term "family" throughout this Article, I mean people who take primary
responsibility for caring for one another. I do not mean the word to be defined by blood relations or
legally defined states, such as marriage, although those conditions can be predecessors to a family
relationship. Families can be lovers, friends, or communal living situations.
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Tort damage awards have made a feeble attempt to recognize some
of these needs of tort victims. Some damage awards reach elevated sums
based on intangible injuries (noneconomic loss for pain and suffering, loss
of enjoyment of life, loss of consortium, increased risk or loss of chance,
cancerphobia, emotional distress, and the like). These dollar amounts
often are added to already massive compensatory awards for past and
future hospital and medical expenses, past and future wage loss, rehabilitative expenses, and other special economic loss damages. For many advocates of damage caps, the costs of economic loss damages are perhaps
justifiable, 67 but monetary damages for non-economic loss are inappropriate and distort the economy and judicial process. 68
Money cannot begin to compensate for the loss of a loved one, nor
for the pain and suffering one must endure with a debilitating, deforming
or degenerative injury. The fear of contracting deadly diseases from unconsented exposure to toxic substances, the inability to have children or
the pain of having children who are genetically injured, and the indignity
and dehumanization of being a calculated risk of loss in a corporate
profit quest are non-compensable. 69 Tort judgments are money judgments because we have not developed any other "coin" of worth or value
in our society. This limited measure of value is a sad statement about all
of us, not about the tort system. Since injured victims are already in
court seeking monetary compensation for their out-of-pocket expenses, it
is not surprising that they would seek monetary compensation for all
their injuries, including their emotional distress, their increased risks,
damages to their family relations, and the like. If those facets of injury
go "uncompensated" by tort or are "unacknowledged" by tort remedies,
the severity of these harms would be demeaned.
Until we devise other legal remedies that respect all the realities of
these injuries and seek to alleviate these harms, how can we blame com67. Advocates of damages caps on non-economic losses also usually propose abolition of the
collateral source rule. By eliminating the collateral source rule, defendants will not be responsible to

pay plaintiffs (actually plaintiffs' insurers) for health care coverage or other first-party insurance that
paid plaintiffs' initial out-of-pocket expenses.
68. See ATTORNEY GENERAL COMM. REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON
THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE
AVAILABILUTY AND AFFORDAmLITY, in Liability InsuranceCrisis, HearingsBefore the Subcommit-

tee on Economic Stabilization ofthe House Committee on Banking Financeand Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 197-279 (1986) (calling for a statutory limit on non-economic damages); Note, 1986
Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluationof Caps on Damagesand Limitationson Joint and
Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 628, 635-38 (1988).
69. Richard Abel, who argues that the problem of tort law is underclaiming, criticizes tort law
for commodifying love, pain and suffering, loss, and other intangible harms by translating them into
monetary awards. Abel, Too Few Claims, supra note 18, at 443-44. Accord Ingber, supra note 31, at
783-85 (monetary awards for non-pecuniary damages do not provide meaningful compensation to
the victim of an intangible injury).
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mon law tort or tort victims for following our social norms and translating intangible injuries into the materialist language of our culture, the
language of dollars? Our society measures the value of everything in
terms of dollars-labor, property, rights, harms, breaches of promises,
even injured relationships. Some bemoan valuing life, injuries, or pain in
dollars, but because we constantly fail to devise another medium, we fall
back into the language of money. If we implore courts not to demean the
harm by awarding money, then we provide "no compensation" at all. By
taking an all-or-nothing approach, the legal system, and consequently the
tort system, has forced plaintiffs into prayers for money damages to compensate these intangible injuries. Denying legal recognition of the harm
by failing to award money or devise alternative "compensation" sends
negative messages to plaintiffs about the importance or value of their
lives, autonomy, and the range of their suffering. When our justice system fails in this fashion, it risks losing the consent of the governed.
Monetary tort damages veer far from the mark in compensating for
intangible injuries, but the legal system has been silent about alternatives.
Critics have blamed common law tort wrongly for this problem. We
should look closer to our core. If we criticize the commodification of
injury-a wholly justified criticism-our focus should not be on tort law
and tort reform but rather systemic political, economic, and social
change. When we have changed our values, ethics, and ideology, tort
law will follow. It is not the responsibility of tort law to change our
value system, norms, and perspectives. Tort rules can cooperate in those
changes, or nudge them along, but they cannot act alone. The monetization of injury is a structural defect in our legal system. We must decide
collectively that health, safety, and human relationships take priority
over economic efficiency, freedom of contract, and private profit. Our
legal system must be more imaginative and responsive to the real human
needs and circumstances of tort victims. This is one of the most appro70
priate places in law for compassion, empathy, and caring.
Not only do we translate injuries and pain into dollars, we also
translate responsibility into dollars. 71 If our justice system attributes re70. See Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1575 (1987) (empathy aids the procedures by which a judge or other legal decisionmaker reaches a conclusion and the
processes of justification in a way that disembodied reason cannot).
71. Dollars and their equivalents have become our society's foremost value. We may have an
ideology about other values, but when push comes to shove, dollars win. In this manner, the risk of
injury and its costs can become an exchangeable commodity. From this insight, some torts scholars
are now arguing that one should be able to bargain for greater or lesser risks to life and limb at
different costs. P. HUBER, LIABILrrY, supra note 17, at 18; Robert Cooter & Stephen Sugarman, A
Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort Claira." Tort Reform by Contract, in NEw DIREcriONS IN
LIABILrrY LAW, supra note 18, at 174.
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sponsibility to parties for harms and has at its disposal only the possibility of making monetary awards against those parties, then responsibility
ultimately becomes solely a monetary obligation. It may even end up as
a monetary obligation drawn from another's resources rather than from
the person who generated the harm, because payment is made by prepurchased liability insurance.
Justice is purchasable. 72 The quality of representation and the likelihood of getting a lawyer to represent you often depends upon how much
you can pay or how much the lawyer can expect to recover. This is most
clearly evident when we compare the civil justice system to the criminal
justice system. In criminal court, where defendants' lives and liberties
are threatened, representation often is provided by publicly-funded lawyers who are overworked and underpaid, and whose resources are negligible. Yet, when the issue in a civil lawsuit is how dollars should be
passed around among corporations and individuals (e.g., mergers, leveraged buy-outs, securities, antitrust, mass tort, government contracts,
copyright and patent infringements, major personal injury, real estate
transactions), there is top-notch representation on every minor procedural point. Money speaks loudly in our justice system. Monetary disputes seem to take priority over issues of life and liberty in terms of the
legal resources devoted to them. And money certainly affects the availability of lawyers and resources.
Ironically, we generally maintain the belief that the ideal of justice is
above the fray of commodification that otherwise has corrupted the tort
system. The unexplained gap between the ideology of the justice system
and the realities of its functioning creates a cognitive dissonance that has
been attributed wrongly to common law tort and has motivated some of
the strongest tort reform claims. The legal system in general-not just
the tort system-has commodified justice, and we should not be surprised when tort juries and tort victims understand this insight and react
by increasing awards to reflect their sense of the injustices suffered by
plaintiffs.
Justice requires a sensitivity to the experiences of the parties, the
contexts of their conflict, and the preservation of their relationships. Jus72. Since one goes to court to seek justice, and since going to court costs a great deal of money,
justice, as well, has been commodified and monetized. This is particularly evident in the trend to

settle most tort cases. Professor Marc Galanter reported in 1986 that many cases are settled or
terminated after filing but before trial. Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46
MD. L. REv. 3, 8 (1986) ("In the federal courts, cases reaching trial have fallen from 15.2% of
terminations in 1940 to 5.0% of terminations in 1985. In state courts, too, a smaller portion of cases
is decided by full contest than in the past." (footnotes omitted)). Since justice is a commodity that
can be purchased, if the market value of justice (e.g., the cost of a jury trial) is too high, then it can
be purchased in lesser amounts or other forms, as with other commodities.
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tice involves care, dignity, and respect. It is the glue that holds together
our trust in the legal system, our support for its legitimacy. When a tort
plaintiff finally works up the anger or courage to entangle herself in this
alienating system, she does so because she feels an absence of justice. She
feels that unless something is done to acknowledge (and right) the wrong
73
she suffered, she can no longer trust the system.
For our social order to be successful, we all need to believe that
there is a place where we can find just resolutions of our conflicts, remedies for our harms, appreciation and acceptance of our differences, and
recognition for our individual and common humanity. The tort system
has the potential to provide the appropriate remedies for some plaintiffs,
some of the time. The substitution of a statutory monetary compensation
program, socialized health care, claims facilities, or alternative dispute
mechanisms will not meet these needs. Those substitutions may all be
important steps for plaintiffs, but unless all other kinds of litigation are
eliminated or altered in a similar fashion, mass tort plaintiffs will be less
empowered rather than more.
Justice is a passionate concept that inspires us. Belief in its presence
motivates us to go on with life; its absence angers and frustrates us and
causes hatred. Money provides no substitute. An order for the payment
of money might indicate the state is trying to ensure that justice is done,
but the payment of money does not amount to justice. Monetary compensation is only a part of the motivation of injured parties in tort actions. If compensation for out-of-pocket expenses were provided through
some insurance or statutory compensation scheme, all plaintiffs' needs
still would not be met. I suspect plaintiffs would continue to use a judicial system. There is a human-social need for dignity, respect, empowerment, and an ideology of fairness that a system of justice provides. This
aspect of the judicial system cannot be replaced or eliminated without
serious consequences to our communal well-being. If we permit injured
parties to seek justice through lawsuits when their commercial contracts
are broken or their property is impaired, but only permit resort to a statutory compensation program for injured parties when their bodies are
maimed or their health impaired, we send a strong message about what
73. In order for our society to function, we must consent to our social and political organizations. We need trust, belief in possibilities of fairness, justice, equality, respect, and social community. Even if these are only shared myths, we ne ed to believe in them, otherwise we will opt out or
fight for them to be restored. We can opt out by being criminals, anti-social, alienated, angry
6migr~s, or revolutionaries, or we can stay and either fight back through political processes, litigation, and protests, or through extra-political process like riot and revolution. In his Chronicle ofthe
Celestial Curia,Professor Derrick Bell explains some of these options for people disillusioned in our
social-political-legal order. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUsIVE QuEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE

51-74 (1987).
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we value in society. What can we expect injured plaintiffs to feel about
the meaning of justice in our society when courthouses are available to
remedy economic and property transactions but not to remedy wrongs to
health and well-being? If alternative dispute mechanisms are required
for mass personal injury actions but not for other harms, that same
message is sent. Why are these physically, emotionally, and psychologically injured people being steered from courthouses, while people disputing about property and money find unobstructed passage?74
If we blame the tort system for translating injury and harms into
money, we are making the same kind of mistake we make when we blame
a rape or domestic violence victim for male violence against her. As I
explained earlier, we must seek out the appropriate source of responsibility for this state of affairs. This Section of my Article has illustrated a
few of the problems of our legal political system that have fueled the
liability crisis. These general problems of our legal system have been
wrongly blamed on common law mass tort. I suggest that the blame cast
upon mass tort law has diverted our scholarly, practical, and political
attentions from the root of the problem. The current liability crisis will
not vanish unless we make changes in the way in which our legal system
understands corporations and the mass harms they cause, rids itself of
false dichotomies, finds alternatives to litigation for economic loss, and
creates new remedies for intangible injuries suffered by mass tort victims.
In the next two Sections, I propose specific modifications of mass tort law
and remedies.

III. THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
NoNLiAILrry IN MASS TORT CASES
I still believe, despite much contrary evidence, that the end or goal
of a judicial process in the United States is, or at least ought to be, justice.
Recognizing that justice is not a "thing" with clear boundaries and content, and that what is just is often open to dispute and disagreement,
there are still some prerequisites for just resolutions of disputes on which
we generally agree. One necessary prerequisite to justice is the equalization of power between disputing or conflicting parties. If one party can
overpower another, then problems are solved by brute strength, wealth,
or privilege. Justice, in contrast, requires consideration of the particular
facts and circumstances underlying the dispute. In this Section, I argue
that in mass tort actions the established judicial process fails to balance
the power of injured plaintiffs and corporate defendants, and that such a
74. See DAAN BR~vEMAN, PROTECTING CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS: A ROLE FOR FED-

ERAL COURTS 125-30 (1989).
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balance is a necessary prerequisite to a truly just resolution. To begin to
balance the power between injured plaintiffs and corporate defendants, I
explore the idea of shifting the burden of proof and the presumption of
nonliability in mass tort cases.
In our current formulation of mass tort law, we presume the plaintiff will be "strictly liable" for her own harm75 unless she can prove that
the defendant was "at fault," the activity was abnormally dangerous, 76 or
the product was "defective." '77 In a tort system primarily based on fault,
this presumption, in effect, results in the imposition of liability upon a
"faultless" party. 78 There is nothing natural or necessary about the presumption that the injured party should bear her own loss unless she can
shift it through legal procedures. 79 The dubious placement of the initial
economic loss and the burden of proof can be attributed to two missteps
in reasoning. First, the false parallels that are made between who bears
the burden in criminal and civil cases, and second, the justice system's
failure to consider power imbalances and inequalities in determining who
should bear burdens of proof and production.
A.

Rationalefor Allocation of Burden of Proofin CriminalLaw

In our criminal law system, the state, with all its power, seeks out
and prosecutes alleged wrongdoers. Controversies between citizens are
translated through the criminal law into controversies about the wellbeing and maintenance of the community. The state uses its consensual,
collective, coercive power to rectify wrongs to the public. The might of
the state's legal apparatus is aimed at the accused. For this reason and
because of the potential for abuse of power and inequality when the public power charges a private entity or individual, we have a system that
initially favors a defendant with presumptions of innocence and the
power to force the state to bear the burden of proof without the defendant's assistance. A criminal defendant is presumed innocent until proven
guilty; she is permitted to sit silently and let the state make its proof or
fail to convict her. As if there were actual balance scales weighing the
75. This common law presumption was plainly articulated by Justice Holmes in the 19th century and carries forth to this day. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76-78 (Howe
ed. 1963) ("The general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where it falls.").
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §§ 519-20 (1976).
77. Id § 402A.
78. See Jules Coleman, The Morality ofStrict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 260

(1976).
79. Guido Calabresi and his co-authors have suggested a reverse Learned Hand test where the
loss would lie with the injurer unless the victim could have avoided the accident more cheaply.
Guido Calabresi & Alvin Klevorick, Four Testsfor Liability in Torm, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 585, 58791 (1985); Guido Calabresi & Jon Hirschoff, Towarda TestforStrict Liability in Torms 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1077 (1972).
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power of a defendant and the state, the state's initial advantage rooted in
its presumptively greater collective power and resources is countered or
"balanced" by the weightier burdens of proof (persuasion and production) and presumption of innocence, so that ultimately the balance is
level. If the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence were not
available to criminal defendants, the state's collective power would unjustly overpower a defendant. Many judicial systems do not afford a
criminal suspect this benefit; they do not make an attempt (even an ideological attempt) to equalize the power of the parties, or to level the power
of the most powerful party (i.e., the state). 80 The power-leveling accomplished by the allocation of burdens of proof on the state (plus the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of persuasion) and the presumption
of innocence for the defendant in our criminal system promotes our belief
that justice is being done rather than raw power being exercised. 8 l It is
inappropriate in mass tort cases against large, public corporate enter-

prises to require injured plaintiffs to bear a similar burden of production,
persuasion, and proof to that borne by the state in criminal cases. Re-

ducing the standard of persuasion required in mass tort from the criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to a "preponderance of the
evidence" standard 82 does not eliminate the problem.

In our common law system of civil or private law justice, the state is
not a party to controversies between citizens. It does however, provide a

forum for the resolution of conflicts, provide the rules of law and procedure, promote an ideology about the availability of justice in that forum
under those rules, decide the conflicts, and offer its power for the enforce80. Witness, for example, the recent prosecutions and executions of the Chinese workers involved in the Tiananmen Square protests in June 1989. See Nicholas Kristof, Troops Attack and
Crush Being Protest; Thousands Fight Back, Scores Are Killed; GeneralStrike Is Urged as Officials

Announce End of 'Rebellion,' N.Y. Times, June 4, 1989, § 1, at 1,col. 6; Paul Lewis, ChinaIs Said to
Execute Some in Secret, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1989, at A3, col. 4. These Chinese workers were not
even permitted to put on a defense.
81. Good arguments can be made that these beliefs are a false ideology that does not match the
material reality, and that it is actually disempowering and pacifying to maintain this ideology because people consent to something that is not "real." See Gabel & Harris, supra note 45, at 374;
ANTONIO GRAMscI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI (G.

Nowell-Smith ed. 1971). Although I am persuaded by this argument, I remain undecided about
what strategy to take, and I feel that it is useful to argue within the ideology as well as against the
ideology's disempowering aspects.
82. Steve Gold distinguishes between the burden of proof (of causation) and the standard of
proof (preponderance of the evidence), and criticizes the law for collapsing these two separate concerns. Steve Gold, Causationin Toxic Torts: Burdensof Proof,StandardsofPersuasion,and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L. J. 376, 378 (1986). For purposes of this essay, I use "burden of proof" to
mean an obligation to produce evidence and convince a court or jury about the correctness of a
position in order to prevail. Wigrmore referred to this as the "risk of nonpersuasion" and "the risk of
nonproduction." 9 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2485, 2487 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
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ment of its decisions. As the provider of forums for justice and as the
judge, the state fails mass tort plaintiffs.
In many ways, mass tort actions are more like public law actions
than the private law actions that traditionally have been used to resolve
other kinds of accident disputes.3 3 Mass torts usually involve many
plaintiffs, public harms that can be wide-spread or slow-developing,
needs for deterrence of further similar conduct, and enormous potential
burdens on the judicial system. Unlike the parties to an ordinary accident case, mass tort plaintiffs typically are less empowered than mass tort
corporate defendants.84
B. DisparateEmpowernent of Injured Mass Tort Plaintiffs and
CorporateDefendants
As with criminal cases, mass tort cases involve disputes between citizens about public harms that need to be rectified. But in the mass tort/
corporate liability context, we have private citizens (rather than the
state) utilizing their own resources to right these wrongs and remedy the
harms. In many ways, this opportunity for private initiative is a glory of
tort law, because an injured plaintiff is not dependent upon the will and
energy of the state to prosecute her claim. The tort system permits ordinary citizens to call any defendant to answer for his alleged wrongdoing.
Neither the specific consent nor participation of the state is required. To
a small extent, a plaintiff is imbued with the power of the state-a power
to require or coerce a defendant to come forward and answer or risk a
loss. But a plaintiff does not have the state power behind her in any
other way. She does not have the economic or political resources of the
state, legal representation by state attorneys, access to information, collective power, authority or legitimacy, or the background power to employ force if necessary.85 While groups of plaintiffs may accumulate
some power by virtue of their numbers, their power is negligible compared to organized corporate entities. Plaintiffs' groups are tenuously
connected because one group's success may conflict with the success of
another group, due to limited corporate assets available for compensa83. For a discussion of the public/private law distinction, see supra note 41.
84. In accident cases, in which defendants are associated with others who have power over the

defendant (employment contexts, car ownership liability), the law often imposes vicarious liability
on the empowered party.
85. Plaintiffs may gain some collective power by combining with other plaintiffs in class actions, or by consolidating their claims for certain purposes. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23. This collective
power, while valuable, differs from the collective power of the state (or even a corporate defendant)

because it is created spontaneously for purposes of the litigation and is not pre-existing and preorganized. See supra text accompanying note 80.
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tion. In addition, their joint success may be dependent upon newly

formed associations with strangers who also happen to be

victims.

86

Despite differences between the state and private plaintiffs as initiators of actions, corporate defendants in mass tort suits still come to court
with much of the same protective coating defendants are afforded in
criminal actions brought by the state. They are clothed in a presumption
of nonliability (akin to the presumption of innocence), and the burden of
proof is on the injured victim-plaintiff (as it is on the state). The corporate defendant is advantaged by the judicial allocation of the burden of
proof and presumption of nonliability. The law pays no attention to
whether a defendant is an individual or a highly organized corporation of
inordinate wealth and power.8 7 Defendants are given free rein to utilize
their wealth, knowledge, and familiarity with the legal system, even if
they greatly exceed that of the plaintiff. Defendants can delay, obstruct,
and out-price plaintiffs. Defendants need not make their proof at all, if a
plaintiff cannot first prove her prima facie case. In blatant disregard of
the unequal power, the presumptions about the appropriate initial bearer
of the economic loss and the burdens of proof lie in a defendant's favor.
In all tort cases, but particularly in mass torts, the injured parties
have multiple burdens to bear. Not only are they burdened by the pain,
injustice, and disruptions caused by their injuries, but they also are tangled in a legal system which is unfamiliar, alienating and ritualized. 88
The plaintiffs must take on the burden of rectifying the harm they suffered by identifying the harm-causers, discovering the nature and extent
of the risks imposed and harms resulting, and taking corporate defendants to court to force them to take responsibility for the consequences of
86. Some plaintiffs in mass tort cases have tried to compensate for their lack of power and
resources by relying on entrepreneurial, risk-taking activities of law firms who provide front money
for these litigations-and even on investor attorneys who purchase interests in mass litigation. This
strategy raises many ethical questions between lawyers and clients that need to be explored further,
particularly in regard to settlements. See, eg., In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 Bankr. 742, 747 (E.D. Va.
1988) (Dalkon Shield bankruptcy); Lord, supra note 29 (Agent Orange settlement).
87. Defendants in mass tort cases are typically powerful corporations with economic, political,
and opportunity power. See generally R. MOKHIBER, supra note 33. In major mass tort litigation,
the defendants have included corporations such as Johns-Manvilie Corporation, see id. at 277-88
(asbestos), Eli Lilly and Abbott Laboratories, see id at 175-79 (DES), A.H. Robins Co., see id. at

157-61 (Dalkon Shield), Dow Chemical, see id at 80-83 (Agent Orange), Hooker Chemical, see Id.
at 269-76 (Love Canal), Union Carbide, see id at 93-94 (Bhopal), and Exxon, see Laura Mansnerus,
A PaperSpill Due on the Valdez Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1990, at D2, col. I (Valdez oil spill).
Unlike a fortuitously associated group of plaintiffs, defendant corporations are pre-organized and
unified within their corporate structures, have a single purpose with respect to the litigation, usually
have in-house or retained counsel (and hence immediate access to legal information), access to inhouse experts and external funds for additional help, sources of information within the corporate
structure, and many other pre-trial advantages.
88. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 45; see also DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY

(1983).
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their actions. Since a plaintiff is required to bear the loss unless she can
shift it to another, I call this presumption the "presumption of liability"
or "presumption of responsibility." The presumption theoretically could
be placed on any of the parties to a dispute. In mass tort cases there is a
presumption of nonliability for the corporate defendant-that is, a defendant is not liable for the harms or initial out-of-pocket expenses, unless a plaintiff can prove its liability. Until they settle or win their case,
the costs of the accident or injury loss falls on the plaintiff. These would
not be insignificant burdens, even if imposed on healthy citizens, but in
mass tort cases they rest even more heavily on physically or emotionally
harmed victims. Yet there is another dynamic besides placing the burden on an already injured party that significantly disables plaintiffs in
mass tort.
The crux of my argument is that parties in mass tort litigation come
to the courthouse differently empowered. 89 Because our ideology of jus89. For the moment in discussing differential empowerment, I am ignoring the cultural identity
factors that disempower people in our society based on race, gender, class background, sexual preference, religious or ethnic background, age, or different physical capabilities. These are critical aspects
of empowerment, and they are deserving of our constant and full attention. Nonetheless, for purposes of this Article, I am writing primarily about differences of wealth, knowledge, access, and
political power. These differences between mass tort victims and corporate defendants in mass tort
cases parallel (and often even accompany) differential empowerment in society based on cultural
identity. Despite an ideological pretense that parties involved in litigation are equals as they enter
the courtroom, economic-social-political power is distributed unequally between parties, particularly
in mass torts.
The unprivileged litigant, and particularly the tort plaintiff, is disempowered within the legal
system by the use of formal rules and language that often are counterintuitive, unfamiliar, alienating,
and arcane. These rules present artificial legal impediments that limit a tort plaintiff's ability to
speak for herself in her own words and tell her story. Instead, she must shape her story to fit within
legal precedent and doctrine and she must conform to the symbolism of dress and demeanor, ritual,
and authority. This whole system is disempowering for an injured plaintiff whose knowledge, culture, and daily life might be very distanced from legal culture.
On the other hand, business and large corporations fit well into the legal culture. This is especially apparent in mass tort cases against large, corporate enterprises, because much of what happens
throughout the litigation process and in the courtroom is dependent upon the work, knowledge and
power of lawyers, technical and scientific experts, and investigators, who are often on big corporations' payrolls. Corporations consciously plan for the contingency of potential litigation. PETER
REUTER, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED CORPORATE LiAmrrY: AN EXPLORA-

Institute of Civil Justice, No. N-2807-ICJ, 1988); Rosenberg, supra note 41, at
902-05. Plaintiffs usually do not have any of these advantages. They do not know that they are
going to be injured until after tragedy strikes. The larger, more widespread, and more subtle the
harms and risks imposed by a defendant corporation, the more time and expense required for discovery. They cannot really know if there is a "smoking gun" until they find it; and they have to find it
before it is destroyed. The destruction or concealment of important corporate documents by defense
counsel and defendants has characterized some mass tort litigation. See- g., Anderson v. Cryovac,
Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988), remandedsub nom. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 127 F.R.D.
1 (D. Mass. 1989) (in action for injuries due to contamination of municipal waterwells report on
groundwater flow concealed by defendant), new trialdenied, 129 F.R.D. 394 (D. Mass. 1989), aff'd,
900 F.2d 388, (1st. Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 233 (1990); Hense v. G.D. Searle & Co., 452
TORY STUDY (Rand
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rice includes the notion that "justice is blind"-that justice will not let
differential wealth and empowerment influence her decision on the merits
of the dispute°-these differences are "ignored." 9 1 We are encouraged
to believe that our justice system and its courts are a public space where
all citizens will have equal voices before the law, even if race, gender,

class, sexual orientation, disability, or other factors disadvantage people
elsewhere in our society. Complaints can be aired and justice sought,

regardless of a party's status, wealth or power. Nevertheless, power
clearly affects the judicial process. Time and again we see a judicial system in which power is confirmed, and the law privileges the privileged, in
fact if not in theory. Yet the ideology of equality-before-the-law remains

strong.
Accompanying our ideology of equality-before-the-law is an expectation that the judge and legal process somehow will intervene, if neces-

sary, to balance the unequal power between the parties, so that justice
can prevail. Judges are supposed to ensure a fair contest. 92 An expectation of judicial intervention in the power dynamics seems to clash with

other systemic constraints that implore a judge to be neutral, objective,
and to apply universal rules that do not acknowledge the power dynamics. No matter how carefully we develop rhetoric and ideologies about

equality-before-the-law, without judicial or judicial process interventions,
they are false. We cannot subvert the realities of power differences by

ignoring them or by pretending to employ neutral rules that are "blind"
to these differences. 93 Neutral rules will at best perpetuate the status quo
94
of power differences and its effects.

N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 1990) (in action for personal injuries attributed to the Copper-7 IUD, defendant
fined for concealing index to 12,000 documents in face of repeated discovery requests); Lord, supra
note 29.
90. Corrective justice for parties who are less empowered or have been subordinated or oppressed in our society ought not be defeated by their status in the power hierarchy. We do not think
that race, class, or gender statuses, for example, should hamper plaintiffs' quest for justice.
91. Power inequities are ignored in the sense that they are not spoken of, but not in the sense
that the inequities do not make a difference. See Frank Vandall, Judge Posner'sNegligence-Efficiency Theory: A Critique, 35 EMORY L.J. 383, 405 (1986). To truly ignore these power differences
and their effects, a court must alter the dynamics to eliminate their advantages or disadvantages.
92. See generally RUGGERO ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: READINGS, MATERIALS

AND CASES (1976).
93. This critique is made forcefully by feminist scholars in their challenges to formal equality.
See CATHARINE MAcKINNON, Difference and Dominance, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DisCOURSES ON LrtE AND LAW, supra note 27; Lucinda Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory: A Way
Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1120 (1986); Christine
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1279, 1282 (1987).
94. Neutral rules often replicate the original power imbalances in divorce, see Sally Sharp,
FairnessStandardsand SeparationAgreements: A Word of Cautionon ContractualFreedom, 132 U.
PA. L. REv. 1399, 1405-07 (1984). Mediation in divorce and in wife abuse cases have shown that
third party intervention often is necessary to equalize the power of the parties or else the stronger,
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Despite its many claims to the contrary, our justice system is not
blind to wealth and power. The relationship between justice and power
prevents many injured parties from access or entry to the legal system in
the first instance. People who disbelieve the ideology of equality-beforethe-law fear that their lesser status or power will defeat their quests for

justice. Others, who have been acculturated into the ideology of equality-before-the-law, suffer cognitive dissonance when they are faced with a

very different reality and lived experience. Justice is a loom for our social
fabric. The ideal of equal-justice-before-the-law informs our social con-

sciousness, secures our political consent, and enables social cohesion
across "difference, 95s thereby lending courts their legitimacy.
If parties are differently empowered and that power differential impacts on the process before the court, then the possibility of equal justice
will be defeated. Therefore, we must ask how courts and legal principles

can neutralize or level power inequalities between parties, so that justice
can be realized.
C. PartialSolutions to DisparateEmpowerment of Injured Plaintiffs
and CorporateDefendants in Mass Tort Cases: BurdenShifting and Presumptions

As noted above, the criminal law intervenes to equalize the power of
the defendant and the state before the court. 96 Why shouldn't the same

power-leveling principle be employed in common law mass tort?
An equal-justice-before-the-law method for equalizing the power of
the parties requires that the burden of proof (risk of nonpersuasion and
more powerful party wins. See Ann Diamond & Madeleine Simborg, Divorce Mediations: Weaknesses, CAL LAW., July 1983, at 37; Lisa Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse
Impact ofInformal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984); Janet Rifkin,
Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 LAw & INEQUALITY 21, 21-31
(1984); Gary Weissman & Christine Leick, Mediation and Other Creative Alternatives to Litigating
Family Law Issues, 61 N.D.L. REv. 263, 282-83 (1985).
95. As Professor Martha Minow so artfully teaches, social and justice systems should not attempt to erase or ignore difference, but should respect differences and affirm the equal dignity of all
before them. Martha Minow, Foreword-Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 16 (1987).
96. Of course this is all ideological. In fact, the state overpowers criminal defendants all the
time before trial. Criminal defendants are "coerced" into plea agreements based on veiled threats
that if they exercise their "rights," then they will end up with greater punishment. In addition,
criminal defendants understand that the presumption of innocence is not necessarily accepted by
judges, prosecutors, juries (and even some criminal defense attorneys). Recognizing the enormous
disparity between actual practice and the ideology does not alter the rationalization for the rules. If
we were able to alter the ideology about the respective power of the parties and the appropriate
burdens of proof and persuasion in mass tort or product liability, then we would be making some
progress even if practice lagged behind the ideology. Ideally, practice will be affected substantially
by this proposed change. The ideology is important because it reflects our espoused goals and
values.
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nonproduction) in mass tort cases be allocated on a case-by-case basis to
the more empowered party in the dispute, subject to the particularized
context and parties to a lawsuit or conflict. In initial pre-complaint or
pre-trial proceedings, a court should evaluate the differential power of
the parties and allocate the greater burden of proof to the more empowered party. In mass torts caused by corporate conduct, this burden most
often will fall on the corporate defendant. In addition, the presumption
of "innocence" or "nonliability" should rest with the less empowered
party to the litigation. In mass torts caused by corporate conduct, this
presumption most often would attach to the injured party or parties.
I propose the following solution to the unequal power distribution in
mass torts which would place the initial economic loss on a corporate
defendant who created the risk of harm. When a defendant is a powerful
corporation or collective organization, there should be no presumption in
its favor. Instead the presumption should lie with the injured party in
that case. If a plaintiff is injured or subjected to risk of injury by a massproduced product or corporate for-profit activity, after a limited showing
has been made about the corporation's creation of risk to the plaintiff, a
corporate actor should be required to bear the initial economic loss (medical expenses, lost wages, or income maintenance and special out-ofpocket damages). This presumptive liability would attach to the creation
of a risk of harm during activities for private profit. It would be a rebuttable presumption. The corporate actor would have the option of exculpating itself from responsibility for the harm. The goal would not be to
prejudge the dispute or give an injured victim an unfair advantage, but
rather to level the power of a corporate defendant's accumulated or collective resources and access to knowledge so that it is more comparable
or fair with respect to a potential plaintiff's. Then parties would come
before the court as relative equals.
Burden-shifting presumptions are neither foreign to courts nor to
the common law of torts. Contests over burden-shifting presumptions
and causation recently have preoccupied the Supreme Court in Title VII
employment discrimination cases. 97 Tort doctrines like res ipsa loqui-

97. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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tur 98 and alternative joint liability, 99 some forms of enterprise or marketshare liability, 0 0 and certain rules in strict products liability' 01 shift the
burden of proof of either negligence, causation, or particular facts to
defendants. The difference between those techniques and this proposal is
that, under the current proposal, the burden of proof would be shifted for
purposes of the entire litigation and for all elements of the cause of action
after the plaintiff has made a limited "risk" showing that the corporate
actor may have created a risk of harm to which the plaintiff was exposed.10 2 Also, the burden would be shifted, not based on the facts peculiar to the injury or product, but rather on the comparative power,
98. See, eg., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 460, 150 P.2d 436, 439 (1944);
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 490, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (1944). Res ipsa loquitureither raises an
inference of negligence that permits a plaintiff to get to a jury or raises a presumption of negligence
that shifts the burden to a defendant to rebut, depending upon the particular jurisdiction. DAN

DOBBS, ToRTs

AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILrrY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

FOR INJURY 173 (1985); WILLIAM PROSSER, W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OwEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 39-40 (5th ed. 1984).
99. Alternative joint liability shifts the burden of causation to defendants when all possible
defendants are before the court and proven to have been negligent towards the plaintiff, but it is
impossible for the plaintiff to identify which of several defendants caused the harm. See, eg., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3)
(1965). See also Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975).
100. See, eg., Hall v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(enterprise liability theory whereby burden of proving causation is shifted to defendants where individual defendant-manufacturers cannot be identified and industry-wide standards exist); Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 613, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145 (after plaintiff has
joined a substantial share of the producers in the relevant market, the burden shifts to defendants to
exonerate themselves from liability for their market share), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Abel v.
Eli Lilly, 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (modified alternative liability where if plaintiffjoins all
defendants who sold DES in relevant market, then the burden shifts to defendants to exculpate
themselves), cert denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly Co. 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d
1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (adopted market share theory whereby each defendant manufacturer of
DES liable for its share of the national market), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989); Martin v. Abbott
Labs., 102 Wash. 2d 581, 605, 689 P.2d 68, 380 (1984) (alternative liability market share where
plaintiff need only join one defendant, but if there are more, each defendant is liable for presumptive
pro rata share unless defendant can prove its actual market share is less than the pro rata share);
Collins v. Eli Lilly, 116 Wis. 2d 166, 197-98, 342 N.W.2d 37, 50-52 (adopting risk contribution
theory, once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and that defendant marketed the type of DES
involved in,,the injury, defendant has burden of proving it did not produce or market the DES in the
relevant market), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). These relatively new enterprise or alternative
liability theories (primarily developed in the context of DES litigation) shift the burden of proof of
identity of the defendant who caused the harm from plaintiff to multiple defendants in circumstances
where negligence or strict liability has been proven, but proof of identity of a specific defendant has
been made impossible by no fault of the plaintiff.
101. See, eg., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-32, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 237 (1978) (under "risk-benefit" standard, burden of proof to show that design was not
defective shifts to defendant once plaintiff makes prima facie showing that defect probably caused
injury).
102. Other scholars have made similar proposals. See, eg., Richard Merrill, Compensationfor
PrescriptionDrug Injurie, 59 VA. L. REV. 1, 107-12 (1973) (proposing a form of strict liability and
burden-shifting with prescription drugs).
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resources, and access to knowledge of the parties. To that extent, it
should be easier to apply and predict than the traditional burden-shifting
presumptions that are often more fact specific than party specific.
D.

A Feminist Exercise of Judicialand Legal Power

Even though the state is not a party to mass tort litigation, courts
(and hence the state) exercise considerable power in resolving mass tort
disputes in their capacity as provider of the rules, decisions, and forums.
There are two ways the judicial system can try to alleviate problems associated with the unequal power of parties: (1) through individualized paternalistic moves in which the court acts in an equity-like manner, or (2)
by developing rules or techniques to empower or equalize the power of
the parties. The method chosen to deal with power inequalities affects
the likelihood of just results. To date, the dominant legal approaches to
the inequalities of power between parties have been either exceptional

exercises of paternalistic power (through equitable powers to protect the
vulnerable) or the dominant, non-interventionist approach 103-a

laissez-

faire, free market notion of letting the chips fall where they may, even if
that provides one party with a license to overpower the other. 1 04 Neither
103. Professor Clare Dalton brilliantly highlights the failure of contract doctrine to intervene
based on power inequalities of the parties. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstructionof Contract
Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1106-13 (1985).
104. A laissez-faire approach to the power of the parties is widely accepted, and the power of a
court to act paternalistically to protect vulnerable parties is acknowledged only in the exceptional
cases.

Were we to apply Derridian insights about the hierarchized and dualistic structures of texts and
the usefulness of inverting these hierarchies, we might decide that the non-interventionist and paternalistic concepts were mutually dependent, related through the concept of diffdrance, and that the
law's privileging of the non-interventionist approach is fallacious. See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF
GRAMMATOLOGY 141-64 (G. Spivak trans. 1976); JACQUES DERRIDA, PosrrloNs (1981) (three interviews of Derrida outlining his conceptual dualism). Derrida explains that paired concepts are
mutually dependent rather than separate and independent. Diffdrance is the term Derrida uses to
represent the interdependency of paired concepts and the false distinction between them. For further explanations of the idea of diffdrance as developed by deconstructionists, see JONATHAN
CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 95, 129, 16263 (1982); CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1982); CHRIS

WEEDON, FEMINST PRACTICE AND PoST-STRuCTURALST THEORY 25, 163 (1987); J.M. Balkin,
DeconstructivePracticeand Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 752-53 (1987); Daniel Williams, Law,
Deconstructionand Resistance: The CriticalStances ofDerridaand Foucault, 6 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 359, 363 (1988).
An inversion of the privileging of a non-interventionist approach over a paternalistic approach
might lead us to conclude either that courts regularly ought to employ paternalistic techniques, or
that neither mode should be privileged. But when the Derridian method is combined with a Foucauldian sensitivity to the material manifestations of power and knowledge through discourse, see
HUBERT DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHAEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND
HERMENEUTiCS 44-78 (2d ed. 1983); MICHAEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED IN-

TERVIEWS AND OTHER WRrrINGS, 1972-1977, at 109-33 (1980); PAUL RABINOW, Introduction, in
THE FOUCAULT READER 12-14 (P. Rabinow ed. 1984); C. WEEDON, supra, at 107-25, and a femi-
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empowerment nor power-balancing are discussed. A feminist inquiry, in
contrast, leads to questions about which approaches have been excluded
from the debates about options and why. 10 5 Why have questions of empowerment and power-balancing between parties been excluded in the
current construction of the debates about differently empowered parties?
Can we reconceptualize litigation between differently empowered parties
in light of requirements of justice and equality-before-the-law?
Traditionally, if legal analysts and judges have approached this
problem of unequal power they have done so paternalistically. 10 6 Paternalism involves making decisions or rules for others in what is determined to be their own best interest. 10 7 Although certain commentators
have used the term "paternalism" more narrowly to refer only to instances where the beneficiary is coerced against her will (or her will is
overruled), 10 8 I find this narrow definition too confining. With its roots
in the notion of fatherhood and acting like a father, 10 9 "paternalism"
means making decisions on others' behalf to protect them from harm or
to advance their well-being. Although the motivation for paternalistic
intervention may be altruistic, it inevitably involves an element of autonomy-deprivation for the "protected" party. 10
nist sensitivity to excluded knowledges and the partial, biased perspectives in law, see infra notes
151-52 and accompanying text, a different conclusion presents itself.
105. See Bartlett, supra note 7, at 829; Lucinda Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including
Women's Issues in a Torts Course, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989); Martha Minow, Feminist
Reason: GettingIt and LosingIt, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 47, 47-48 (1988); Heather Wishik, To Question
Everything: The Inquiriesof FeministJurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 68 (1985).
106. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and UnequalBargainingPower 41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982)
(arguing that decisionmakers use paternalist motives under the rhetoric of unequal bargaining
power, although they disguise their motives as distributive or efficient); Frances Olsen, From False
Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84
MICH. L. REv. 1518, 1523-29 (1986) (arguing that the paternalism used by the courts is a false
paternalism).
107. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism. 56 MoI.sr 64, 65 (1972) ("By paternalism I shall understand roughly the interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced.");
David Luban, Paternalismand the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454, 461 (defining paternalism as "the imposing of constraints on an individual's liberty for the purpose of promoting his or her

own good.").
108. Professor Duncan Kennedy uses a narrower definition of paternalism that requires the decisionmaker to overrule the beneficiary's choices or preferences. D. Kennedy, supra note 106, at 572;
accord Olsen, supra note 106, at 1531-34.
109. "Paternalism" is defined in the WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1654 (1981) as "the principles or practices of a government that undertakes to supply needs or
regulate conduct of the governed in matters affecting them as individuals as well as in their relations
to the state and to each other." Paternal means "of or relating to a father." Id.
110. I do not mean to imply that paternalism is necessarily a negative because it deprives a party
of autonomy. The textual statement is more descriptive than judgmental.
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Legal paternalism can be located in certain legislation that "protects" or "controls" people in their own best interests" I and in doctrinal
formulations or individual exercises of power by courts. Judicial (as opposed to legislative) paternalism is usually an act of noblesse oblige, a
charitable gesture of mercy, a gift from the empowered. It does nothing
to equalize power, rather, it substitutes the court's power for that of the
"underprivileged," "unempowered," or severely "unequal" party in a

particular circumstance. For example, using concepts like unconscionability, courts have paternalistically voided contract provisions for
unempowered promisors (widows, immigrants, the poor, the injured), devisors, or tenants who were taken advantage of because of their unequal
bargaining power.1 12 These paternalistic interventions by courts have

sought to benefit "underdogs," but they have done so by having the court
overpower the "bully." Occasionally in tort, courts paternalistically
have protected less empowered parties by imposing special or higher

standards of care on those with whom they deal 1 3 or by preventing the
interposition of affirmative defenses.114 A court hears a particular case
on the facts and, in its mercy, decides a point of argument or law in favor

of a disadvantaged party to protect that party from abuse or overbearing.
This paternalistic intervention is not bad or wrong for a court to do, but
it is not the same as empowering a disadvantaged party.
I would like to emphasize a previously excluded conception of
power that entails empowering others or power-balancing and examine
111. For example, laws requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets or prohibiting the use of certain
drugs.
112. See. eg., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(court granted consumer relief from unconscionable installment sales contract with furniture company); Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 538, 279 A.2d 640, 645 (1971) (court willing to intervene
when company specifically marketed overpriced encyclopedias to minority and low-income clients
with little education); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 28, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (2d
Dist. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967)
(court refused to enforce unconscionable sales contract made with low-income, Spanish speaking
person for over three times value of appliance). See also D. Kennedy, supra note 106; U.C.C. § 2302 (1987).
113. For example, a higher duty of care is owed by common carriers and innkeepers to individual members of the public, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965), and courts sometimes refuse to waive duties of care despite exculpatory clauses or releases. See, e.g., Tunkl v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 101, 383 P.2d 441, 446, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 38 (1963) (not
enough evidence that releasing party acquiesced voluntarily to the shifting of risk for necessary
services such as hospital care).
114. See, eg., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 168, 406 A.2d 140, 147
(1979) (court refused to permit a contributory negligence affirmative defense in strict products liability case), supersededby N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-3a(2) (West 1987); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp.,
60 N.J. 402, 409-10, 290 A.2d 281, 285-86 (1972) (court refused to permit a contributory negligence
defense when negligent machine design created the very risk of harm that plaintiff suffered); Siragusa
v. Swedish Hosp., 60 Wash. 2d 310, 319, 373 P.2d 767, 773 (1962) (court barred assumption of the
risk affirmative defense in employment context).
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some consequences of making this change. I propose a feminist form of

legal intervention for resolving conflicts between dramatically differently
empowered parties-a type of intervention that is very different from the
paternalistic variety.'1 5 This type of intervention is designed to enhance
opportunities for autonomy, dignity, choice, and decisionmaking. 116
This proposed power-balancing or power-enhancing strategic intervention is an attempt to create a space in the legal world where the structures that work daily against people's personal empowerment are used

instead for their benefit. The goals are to empower those who have not
been privileged and to erase the advantages of others' power privileges in
situations in which lack of such privileges has been disempowering or
suppressive to others. The effort to level the power differential between
litigants is not a paternalistic exercise of power, but instead can be seen
as a power-balancing or empowering move.
Professor Robin West, in her influential article, Jurisprudenceand

Gender,cogently distinguishes between dominant male and female exper-

iences of power and understandings about its use and responsibilities." 7
West suggests that many women's experiences of having power (as op-

posed to the experiences of most men) arise in situations of grave inequalities of power, such as in parenting or teaching, in which women often

use their power to protect and guide rather than to strong-arm or control. She explains that parental (in particular, maternal) power, derived

from the power and knowledge differential between parent and child, is
interpreted by its holder as a responsibility to care for the unempowered
115. This proposal is not meant to substitute for paternalistically motivated doctrine or applications of equity, but to affect the process dynamics and through them substantive justice in the courtroom, in negotiations, and for settlement.
116. This proposal might arguably fall within what Duncan Kennedy means by distributive motives. See D. Kennedy, supra note 106. It would depend upon whether distributive motives could
aim to distribute power (rather than material resources) within one forum (judicial system) and not
broadly across the economy and politics.
117. Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 Cm. L. REv. 1 (1988). For further elaboration
on this analysis, see Robin West, Feminism, CriticalSocial Theory and Law, 1989 U. CH. LEGAL F.
59, 80-81. While debates rage about whether these differences are biologically tethered, socially or
psychologically constructed as part of gender, politically constructed through subordination and
oppression, or some mixture of all of these, the sources of these differences are not nearly as important as the ways to which we can put our understandings of them to good use in our practices and
theories of law. I work on the assumption that gender differences do exist, that they are learned, and
that since they are learned, they can be taught, modified and used to improve the quality of all our
lives.
Let me not be misunderstood. Although I believe that our understandings and experiences of
this kind of exercise of power arise out of women's experiences in caregiving to persons less enabled
than they are (e.g., children, elderly, sick or injured), I am not representing that this concept of
power is unique to women or that all women understand power in this manner.
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or less-empowered child, a responsibility to teach and empower.1 18 Sara
Ruddick makes a similar observation about maternal power and prac-

tice. 119 It is the very awareness of the inequality of power that prompts
or produces the responsibility to protect, to enable, and to give care,
rather than to overwhelm or control. The two modalities of power can
be differentiated as "overpowering or controlling/protecting" (a masculinist model) and "empowering or power-balancing" (a feminist
alternative).120

In the masculinist model of intervention, the general power imbalance of the parties as litigants in the court is neither addressed nor altered. The court and the rules of law do not respond to a disadvantaged
party's need for empowerment nor do they balance power in the courthouse so that litigants can have equal access to or opportunities for justice. Legal paternalism does not challenge the distribution of power

between parties or how it impacts on the judicial process itself.
To empower a mass tort plaintiff, a court must alleviate some of the
initial impediments to equal justice posed by the difficulty faced by a
plaintiff in obtaining the necessary evidence to support her claim for re-

lief.121 A corporate producer or actor putatively responsible for the
harm has unobstructed access to the information.1 22 By shifting the burden of proof and production to the party most capable of bearing it (by

virtue of wealth, power, knowledge, and access to information), a court
can balance the power of the parties in their conflict and empower the
disadvantaged party in her quest for justice.1 2 3 In addition, a court can
118. Duncan Kennedy is sensitive to this parental use of power; Kennedy refers to it as "strong
paternalism," and roots it in "lived intersubjectivity." D. Kennedy, supra note 106, at 638.
119. See SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 82-102
(1989) (maternal practice in societies in which children demand protection, nurturing, and training
involves the exercise of maternal power to achieve the goals of preservation, growth, and social
acceptability for one's children).
120. Both the masculinist and feminist approaches to the use of power contain the idea of protecting the vulnerable from harm. The distinction between power-over and empowerment has been
made in other feminist literature. See STARHAWK, TRUTH OR DARE: ENCOUNTERS WITH POWER,
AUTHORITY, AND MYSTERY (1987).

121. It does not make much difference in many cases whether the court uses a negligence or
strict liability theory. Even for products where strict liability is applied as a matter of course, a
plaintiff must prove that the product is defective. That task can involve almost as much investigation, expertise, and lawyer time as proof of negligence.
122. A defendant's greater access to necessary information has been recognized by courts as
grounds for shifting burdens. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432-33, 573 P.2d 443,
454-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236-38 (1978).
123. This power-leveling approach would work just as well in a case in which the plaintiff is a
large corporate organization and the defendant is a less-empowered individual. The burden of proof
and production always would be placed on the more empowered party and the presumption of nonliability always would be on the less-empowered party, regardless of which one is the plaintiff or
defendant.
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impose the initial burden of paying for the economic loss resulting from
the injury on the party better able or more empowered to bear the out-of124
pocket expense.
An interesting side-effect of this change of initial responsibility for
economic losses might be a greater and more immediate use of corporate
political clout to lobby for socialized medical care and income maintenance for injured plaintiffs. If corporate defendants realized from the
outset they would have to advance the money for medical and lost-income expenses until they could go to trial and prove that the burden
should be shifted, then they might take an active role in lobbying legislatures for statutory, tax-funded compensation for these victims. At the
present time, their incentive to lobby for these measures is negligible because the initial loss always falls on the injured party and his or her insurance carrier. If the law presumed that the loss initially fell on the
more empowered party-in cases of mass torts and consumer products
liability this party would be a corporate entity-then that party would
have increased incentive to provide an alternative compensation system.
Plaintiffs as a group do not have the same kind of political power to get
such measures enacted because they do not have advanced knowledge
that they will be plaintiffs. With a change in the burdens of proof and
persuasion and the presumption of nonliability, defendant corporations
immediately would face increased potential liability, and they would seek
political relief or would insure accordingly.
By power-balancing or empowering a party, the court is not interfering in the merits or substance of the controversy. This feminist approach
does not "decide" the case, but rather gives the parties more equal opportunities to present their claims. If we continue with only the masculinist
approach taken by courts, wherein they intervene paternalistically, we
ignore the role that unequal power and resources currently play in the
legal conflict-resolution process itself. Even with this alteration in the
burden of proof and the presumption of nonliability for the plaintiff, defendant corporations in mass tort cases would be as capable of prevailing
in the litigation on the merits as they are today, but they would not be
quite as advantaged in the process by their greater resources, power, or
knowledge.
In summary, courts ought to employ a feminist understanding of
power to empower parties in mass tort cases who face corporate oppo124. The Indian lower court made a similar move in response to the Bhopal tragedy when it
ordered that Union Carbide pay over $190 million into a fund for the victims prior to any trial or
finding of liability. See Andrew Blume, Rita Jensen & Marianne Lavelle, Carbide Blasts Bhopal
Order, Nat'l L.., Apr. 18, 1988, at 6, col. 1., Stephen Adler, Bhopal Ruling Tests Novel Legal

Theory, Wall St. J., May 18, 1988, § 2, at 33, col. 3.
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nents with greater resources, knowledge, power, and access to information. One method for accomplishing this power-leveling or powerbalancing function is through burden-shifting rules that place the risks of
nonproduction and nonpersuasion on empowered corporate defendants
rather than on injured plaintiffs. Another part of this strategy is the use
of a liability-shifting rebuttable presumption, whereby once the plaintiff
has made a simple "risk" showing that a corporate defendant created a
risk of harm to which plaintiff was exposed, the defendant is liable for all
of plaintiff's economic damages (medical, rehabilitative, loss of wages,
specials). The law could require an immediate remedy from the corporation before any finding of liability. 12 5 If the corporation believes the result to be unjust, it could initiate legal action, and in the event that the
corporation wins the legal action, the plaintiff will have to repay the defendant. In addition, if the presumption of nonliability is with the tort
victim or the less empowered party, 126 and the more powerful party must
pay for the loss and wait for the result of the litigation to recoup those
payments, then defendants might not be motivated to delay 127 and resolution might be achieved more quickly. This also would equalize the
parties' bargaining positions for settlement. 128
Empowering victims in their struggle for compensation from corporate tortfeasors will not, in and of itself, eradicate the sources of the liability crisis. One of the sources of the crisis is a skewed account of
responsibility. In the next section, I investigate the meanings of responsibility in tort law and propose a revision of our understanding of
responsibility.

125. See Adler, supra note 124.
126. It is imaginable that with the defendant's burden of proof and the plaintiff's presumption of
nonliability in mass tort cases, a court might require a defendant to escrow some funds for the
plaintiff's benefit, and may entitle plaintiff access to some of those funds for health, maintenance,
and even litigation expenses as needed. This would encourage defendant corporations to accelerate
resolution of the conflicts rather than delay, which is their current strategy. Or the law could require
that defendants' employee compensation and health plan cover the victims after an initial probable
cause showing has been made.
127. See Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 902-03; see also Jan Schlictmann, Eight FamiliesSue W.R.
GraceandBeatriceFoodsfor PoisoningCity Wells with Solvents and CausingLeukemia, Disease,and
Death, in PROOF OF CAUSATION AND DAMAGES IN Toxic CHEMICAL, HAZARDOUS WASTE, AND

DRUG CASES 211 (Practising L. Inst. 1987, Litigation Series No. 341) (illustrates use of delay and
legal maneuvers by corporate defendants). Defendants are usually unaffected by trial delays or posi.
tively affected because the need for money encourages plaintiffs to settle early for less than they
could have won in court, and defendants have the use of their money for their operations and continued growth during the period of delay.
128. For a discussion of the effects of unequal power in settlement, see Owen Fiss, Against Settle.
ment, 93 YALE L.. 1073, 1076 (1984).
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THOUGHTS ABOUT THE MEANING OF RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS
TORTS CAUSED BY CORPORATE DEFENDANTS

"Responsibility" and "responsible" have several different meanings. 129 I want to suggest that the meaning of "responsibility" in tort
law1 30 is too thin. 131 We can improve the tort system by rethinking the
values underlying legal responsibility and making legal responsibility
more multi-dimensional, more contextual, and more informed with insights from feminist theory. In order to think more clearly about the
multiple meanings of "responsibility," I have divided the meanings into
subcategories.1 32 By exposing various interpretations of the concept, I
hope to illustrate that certain meanings of "responsibility" have been
omitted or excluded from legal discourse and to explain how our legal
world can benefit from their inclusion. I recommend the expansion of
our legal account of responsibility to include a holistic, needs-based,
caregiving response. Although it may seem as if this proposal only adds
a meaning or two to the existing base, I intend this proposal to be more
far-reaching. This change in our understanding of responsibility requires
129. Kate Pecarovich has assembled an extensive recent bibliography on responsibility (for
materials produced from 1961-1985) that illustrates the depth and multiplicity of understandings of
responsibility as an ethical and legal concept. Kate Pecarovich, Bibliographyon Responsibility, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 237.
130. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1312 (6th ed. 1990) defines responsibility as "[t]he obligation
to answer for an act done, and to repair or otherwise make restitution for any injury it may have
caused." Responsible means "liable; legally accountable or answerable." Id. at 1312.
This Article is limited to a discussion of the idea of responsibility within the context of the legal
system and, in particular, within the context of torts. Arguments have been made and accepted that
responsibility as a moral or ethical concept is distinct from responsibility as a legal concept. Perhaps
one of the most notorious advocates of that position was Justice Holmes. I am unconvinced that law
and morality should be (or are) autonomous or semi-autonomous disciplines, but I avoid that debate
here. For purposes of this Article, I assume that it makes sense to write about responsibility in the
legal sense only.
131. See Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3, 6-7, 9-10 (1973) (relying on the work of Gilbert Ryle for use of
the terms "thick" and "thin").
132. Although I do not use her categorization, Carol Gilligan has identified different notions of
responsibility. Carol Gilligan, Remapping the MoralDomain: New Images ofSelf in Relationship, in
MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN: A CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN'S THINKING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL

THEORY AND EDUCATION 3 (C. Gilligan, J. Ward, J. Taylor & B. Bardige eds. 1988) [hereinafter
MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN]. She explains:
when asked "What does responsibility mean to you?" a high school student replied: "Responsibility means making a commitment and then sticking to it." This response confirms
the common understanding of responsibility as personal commitment and contractual obligation. A different conception of the self and of morality appears, however, in another
student's reply: "Responsibility is when you are aware of others and you are aware of their
feelings.... Responsibility is taking charge of yourself by looking at others around you and
seeing what they need and seeing what you need... and taking the initiative." In this
construction, responsibility means acting responsively in relationships, and the self-as a
moral agent-takes the initiative to gain awareness and respond to the perception of need.
Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
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us to reconsider how the law remedies personal injuries. It requires a
badly-needed paradigm shift in the values and assumptions of tort law
from a vision of responsibility rooted in atomistic individuals and commodity exchange to one rooted in caregiving-an account that reflects a
recognition that human beings are interdependent. 133 In order to achieve
this end, the meaning of responsibility in law would include a commitment, in advance of harm, to protecting and caring about the health and
safety of other people. In the untoward event of harm, it would mean
taking care of those harmed-that is, personally and interpersonally responding to the needs of harmed people. 134
Tort law has been weighted down by a language and value system
that privilege economics and costs. Every time there is an injury, we
determine legal responsibility by asking about the dollar and efficiency
costs of paying for the harms and/or of avoiding them. Questions of cost
have consistently been our first or second inquiry in cases of mass torts
by corporate defendants.
As harms from mass tort have become more widespread, legal analysis in tort law has become desensitized to the individuals and groups of
people harmed. The more people who are injured or subjected to the risk
of injury, the more tort law dehumanizes people generally, views them as
statistical risks, and sees their injuries as costs of economic growth and
progress. If this kind of legal thinking is inconsistent with our core values, we must reject it outright as violative of human dignity and equality.
Instead, we can require corporate defendants, corporate officers, and
courts to be more socially and personally responsible.
A.

Meanings of Responsibility

Responsibility can be divided temporally into two types of categories: pre-event (prevention-based) 135 responsibility and post-event (response-based) responsibility. Within these broad categories there are
subclasses of responsibility, some of which are used regularly in legal
discourse, and others that seem wholly or partially inoperative in law.
One of tort law's failings is that it does not contain these previously excluded or undervalued meanings of responsibility.
133. There is a conservative human tendency to dismiss major changes as unworkable and to
prefer the status quo. I hope that you, my reader, will fight that impulse and read with an open mind
and sense of possibility.
134. I would equate "taking care of" with Sara Ruddick's definition of maternal thinking and
practice. See S. RUDDICK, supra note 119, at 10-12.
135. In utilizing the word "pre-event" for the responsibility to take care of something before it
happens, I was tickled to discover its connection to the word "prevent."
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The pre-event account of responsibility is important because it indicates who ought to be held responsible if something occurs. 136 Pre-event
or prevention-based responsibility is tied to the notion of power.' 37 The
power to decide and take action entails a responsibility for the decisions
made and action taken (or not taken).1 3 8 With power comes responsibility. They are inseparable. Prevention-based responsibility in mass tort
derives from the power to choose (in a human agency sense) 39 to impose
risks on the health and safety of others or to perform activities that cause
harm. 4 One who "responsibly" exercises this power chooses to prevent harm, to minimize or eliminate risks to others created by activities
or products, to gather information, to advance learning about the conse-

quences of corporate actions, and to stress the values of health, safety,
and human dignity. In wanting people to act more responsibly, we want
them to choose to act with more care and reflection about the possible
effects of their conduct and decisions on others. This is particularly true

in dealing with potential harms caused by the actions of corporations.
For-profit corporate activities are conducted with considerable input and
pre-planning, which affords corporations more opportunities for intervention before harm is caused. We want this exercise of power to occur
before there is harm (pre-event), so that there will be no harm.
Corporate executives and people within organizations must take responsibility for the decisions and actions of their organizations, whether
or not they had direct knowledge. It is the power to have knowledge, the
136. The prevention account of responsibility also includes traditional attributive, causal notions
of responsibility in the factual-cause sense. Although the use of the term "attributive" has some
roots in H.L.A. HART & A. M. HoNoRE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 23 (1959), I do not mean
thereby to imply Hart and Honore's distinction between attributive and explanatory causation. For
an elaboration of that distinction, see Witt Dray, CausalJudgment in Attributive and Explanatory
Contexts, LAW & CoNTEMp. PRoBs., Summer 1986, at 13. Because the focus of this part of my
essay is on the post-event nature of responsibility, I will leave the multiple methods by which we
assign "responsibility" to a party for another day.
137. If you have the power to decide or choose how activities will be conducted or the authority
to "control" people or situations, you are responsible for the consequences of your decisions and the
actions of those under your "control." Power, authority ("control" and "charge"), and choice are
precursors to responsibility in the pre-event or prevention sense.
138. The law is willing to impose liability, even criminal liability, upon a person with this kind of
power. See, eg., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 669 (1975) (CEO held liable for sanitation
problems in one food warehouse in his national company, even though it was under the direct management of other people in a distant city).
139. See eg., JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 216-18, 617-28 (1956).
140. There are many problems with the relationship between the idea of responsibility and
agency that need to be addressed, but to delve into these problems would sidetrack this discussion.
This notion of responsibility seems to entail the idea of a pre-existing subjectivity or autonomous
self-in the liberal sense-that has freedom to make choices rather than being controlled or constructed by structures. Again, this is too large and distracting an issue to flesh out here, but I will
own up to an acceptance of some notion of human agency that is compatible with a possibility of
chosen resistance to power structures.
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power to access necessary information, the power to control or authorize
others to act, the power to choose (rather than be chosen for), the power
to participate in democratic decisionmaking, and even the power to delegate one's power to choose, that carries the responsibility. 14 1 To compel
people imbued with this power to take responsibility for the consequences of their actions and decisions, mass tort law as well as criminal
law must be constructed in a manner that imposes personal liability on
the individuals with the power to make decisions or select among actions. 142 The process of requiring people to take responsibility also requires that the corporation as a whole be held responsible.
But once responsibility for certain consequences can be assigned
based on pre-event exercises of (or failures to exercise) power to promote
the health, safety, and well-being of others, what is required of the responsible party by way of response? The post-event meanings of responsibility are woven through with the word "response."' 14 3 There are two
types of response-a "making amends" or reparations component and a
caregiving component. The reparations-form of responsibility means
making amends, or payments. If you are responsible for a bill or debt or
for damage to someone's car, it means first that you caused or incurred
the obligation (pre-event), and second you have a duty to make the payments or pay for the repairs (post-event reparations sense). In mass tort
law responsibility means monetary reparations. Legal responsibility in
tort translates into an obligation to make reparations-to compensate or
to pay. 144 A tort victim entitled to reparations can invoke the power of
the state to enforce this payment. According to tort law, though, payment fulfills the legal responsibility and the tort victim should ask for
nothing more. 145 Equating legal responsibility with the payment of
money is grounded in two implicit assumptions: (1) Legal responsibility
and paying money are coextensive; and (2) the harms suffered by injured

141. See Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
142. If tort law only holds "responsible" those people who are responsible in the causal sense
and not those who have responsibility based on the power or choosing sense, it will be inadequate to
its assigned task of deterrence or prevention of harmful consequences. Part of the power to produce
products and create risks for profit includes responsibility for the care and well-being of those who
might be affected by the exercise of that power.
143. WEBSTER's THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1935 (1981) defines response as, "1. an

act or action of responding (as by an answer): a responsive or corresponding act or feeling: a responding to a motive force or situation."
144. If conduct was particularly heinous, wilful, wanton or malicious, meeting this responsibility
might also involve paying punitive or exemplary damages. See, eg., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,
119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal Rptr. 348 (1981).
145. Only in the exceptional case can a tort victim get injunctive relief.
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persons can only be compensated in money. 14 6 These assumptions present incomplete images of human experience and provide pathetically inadequate support for an entire law of personal injury.
Post-event responsibility ought to mean more than making reparations. A different notion of responsibility arises out of our interconnectedness as human beings, and it has to do with responding to the
needs of someone through interpersonal caregiving-it means "taking
care of." Although this account of responsibility seems completely absent from the law, it remains central to our life experiences. An example
of a social meaning of responsibility can help to explain the need for
additional understandings of post-event responsibility in law. For two
reasons, I will use an example of a close, interpersonal relationship-that
of parent and child. 147 One reason was hinted at before with respect to
different exercises of power and the relationship between power and responsibility.' 48 Parents are responsible for the health, safety, and wellbeing of their children, in part because they have far greater power
within that relationship and because they have greater power with respect to the outside world to negotiate for their children's benefit. 14 9
Corporate entities that mass-produce products or conduct risk-creating
activities leading to mass harms also have far greater power than the
individuals they harm both within the relationship and with the outside
world. Perhaps if we could determine some of the meanings of responsibility associated with parental power, then we also could learn things
about the meanings of responsibility associated with power in other
contexts.
The second reason I am using a family relationship as an example is
because it can potentially give us access to perceptions about responsibility that traditionally are absent in market-related contexts. Our understandings about responsibility, law, and power in the legal and
commercial worlds were formed in an environment that excluded women.' 5 0 Feminist method invites us to examine systems of knowledge
and power (like law) for biases and to reconstruct them with valuable
aspects of excluded perspectives.I s l To understand what women's per146. In Part H, I criticized translating injury and justice into money terms. That critique is
bound up with this call for a new understanding of responsibility and hence new remedies and
responses to the needs of the injured.
147. It would be just as useful to study the relationship between adult children and their frail
and elderly parents. See David Biegel & Arthur Blum, SpecialIssue" Aging and Family Caregives
13 J. APPLIED SOC. ScI., Fall-Winter 1988-89, at 1-8.
148. See supra notes 103-21 & 135-43 and accompanying text.
149. See S. RUDDICK, supra note 119, at 29-40; West, supra note 117, at 27-28.
150. Bender, A Lawyer's Pimer,supra note 7, at 6.
151. See Bartlett, supra note 7, at 837-49.
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spectives might lend to meanings of responsibility in law or the market,
we must find environments where women have exercised some responsibility and power. Even though women often have subordinate roles in
families, at least they are overtly present in them. And vis-a-vis children,
women often do have power.1 52 Examinations of the exercises of that
power might help us rethink appropriate meanings for responsibility in
the legal context. If legal thinkers are interested in learning how women's experiences and knowledges can be used to reconstruct our legal
world, the family is an appropriate starting point for study.
Admittedly, there is something very different about relationships
within a family or between friends and relationships between strangers or
casual, business acquaintances. The affection, love, and intimacy that
characterize familial and friendship relationships are absent from corporate relationships with a public that is placed at risk by corporate activities. We cannot expect the caring and caregiving behavior in families
that flows from love to apply to harm-causer/mass-tort victim relationships. Nevertheless, corporate harm-causer/mass-tort victim relationships are analogous to those within the family to the extent that they
involve responsibility.
Family members have an initial interpersonal responsibility of care
for one another. At a minimum we understand this responsibility as an
obligation to take care of or care for a family member who is unable to
care for herself. Likewise, once the legal system determines that a corporation is liable or responsible for a harm, it has an obligation to remedy
the harm and to take care of the people harmed. In both cases one party
ends up with responsibility for another. Even though the source of the
responsibility for a family member differs from the source of responsibility in a corporate-victim relationship, once responsibility attaches its
source might no longer be especially relevant to its content. I would like
to explore the complex nature of that responsibility. By shifting to a
post-event meaning of responsibility that includes both a reparations
sense and a caring sense, we can alter the way that the legal and corporate worlds function.
People responsible for the care of children understand that responsibility to and for those children involves a great deal more than money.
Money might buy some of the things children need, but it cannot figure
out what they need at any given time or in any given context or plan how
to provide for those needs. Money doesn't listen to children, soothe their
fears, show them affection, teach them values, or socialize them. People
must take interpersonal responsibility for these activities-the planning,
152. See S. RUDDICK, supra note 119.
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organization, and forethought, the time and emotional sharing, and attention to needs and contexts. These activities are an important part of
what responsibility means in interpersonal relationships. It might include taking financial responsibility, but that aspect of responsibility is
just a piece of the whole.
There is much talk in our society about encouraging fathers to take
responsibility for their children. This is particularly true in the cases of
divorced, separated, and unwed fathers.15 3 If they are responsible for the
children's birth (in the causal or power sense), then their responsibility
(in the post-birth or post-event response sense) is a continuing commitment or obligation to "take care of" the children. But what do we mean
by that use of the concept of responsibility?
In a legal sense, we mean making fathers pay child support. This
sense of responsibility is analogous to paying debts incurred or paying for
the cost of "repairs." In the reparations or amendatory sense, our legal
system claims to be making fathers act responsibly by making them
pay.1 54 But when we are not limiting ourselves to the legal meaning, is
this what we mean when we say that parents have a responsibility for
their children or family members have a responsibility for each other?
Responsibility also means taking care of, giving care to, and caring for.15 5
Being responsible for children means helping them grow into functioning, competent adults. To take care of family members, friends, children,
or the injured, caregivers must give primary attention to others' needs.
There is physical, emotional, and planning work involved in caregiving.
People must help and support one another-it is part of our makeup as
interconnected, mutually dependent beings.
B. Legal Responsibility as "Taking Care of"
The meaning of responsibility in the law must include this notion of
interpersonal caregiving and needs-responsiveness. This meaning of responsibility is explicated in the work of feminist scholars, particularly the
153. See DAVID CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT
LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 262-64 (1985).

79-105 (1979);

154. If responsibility is solely paying money, then one can transfer family responsibility by having someone else pay the money owed. In fact, a cornerstone of our tort system is reliance on
liability insurance to assume responsibility for paying reparations or monetary compensation legally
owed to victims. I do not intend my argument to detract from the advantages of third-party liability
insurance in providing compensation to those injured. I do think, however, that the ability to
purchase liability insurance in advance of harm distances individuals from the harms they have
caused in a way that diffuses personal responsibility.
155. Professor Nel Noddings distinguishes between taking care of and caringfor. NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMINIST APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 9-16 (1984).
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studies of moral development by Carol Gilligan and her associates. 156
Gilligan's work has provided a foundation to a large portion of feminist
scholarship.15 7 I would like to borrow some of her insights to further
develop this notion of responsibility.
Professor Gilligan noted that the standard method of evaluating
moral development based on open-ended answers to hypothetical moral
problems was not attuned to the multiple perspectives expressed by subjects.1 58 Popularly used and respected psychological measuring tools valued answers from the perspective she called an ethic of rights or ethic of
justice. These tests concluded that moral reasoning was more advanced
if it was based on abstract principles (like equality, justice, fairness), objective and universal rules, fair formal procedures, and the balancing of
hierarchical rights (property, contract, duty). Gilligan contrasted the
ethic of rights/justice with another ethic that had been excluded, submerged, or undervalued by contemporary psychological measures. This
different approach or different voice was founded on an ethic of responsibility and care. Gilligan claimed that these different "voices" (of rights/
justice and responsibility/care) depended greatly on different perceptions
of human relationships and ways of regarding others.
Nona Lyons pursued Gilligan's research and found two distinct perspectives of self, relationships, and morality-the separate/objective self
and the connected self.15 9 The separate/objective self is autonomous in
relation to others. It views relationships through a reciprocity perspective, which considers others as one would like to be considered, and assumes that others are the same as oneself. Conflicts are thus mediated
through rules (primarily of equality) and grounded in roles that are de156. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S

DEVELOPMENT (1982); MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN, supra note 132.
157. See, eg., Bender, A Lawyer's Primer,supra note 7; Bender, FeministSolidarity,supra note
7; Finley, supra note 93; Kenneth Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DuKE L.J. 447; Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice. Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.. 39 (1985); Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An
Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitu.
tionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986). For a strong critique of Gilligan's work, see Joan
Williams, DeconstructingGender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989).
At this point in time, Gilligan's metaphor of voice has been overworked and sounds almost
tinny. Despite this devaluation, I think that there are very deep and important insights in her work
and its overuse may cause it to be too easily discarded. For an elaboration of my position on the
usefulness of Gilligan's thesis in law, see Bender, FeministSolidarity,supra note 7. Professor Gilli.
gan is working to overcome some of the original shortcomings in her studies.
158. Carol Gilligan, Adolescent Development Reconsidered, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN
vi, xxxiv-xxxv, supra note 132. In particular, she focused her criticism on Laurence Kohlberg's
multi-stage model. See LAURENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT:
ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1984).

159. Nona Lyons, Two Perspectivev" On Self, Relationships and Morality, in MAPPING THE
MORAL DOMAIN 21, supra note 132.
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rived from obligations and duties. 16 0 The connected self, which is interdependent in relation to others, experiences its relationships through
responses to others in theirterms--e.g., alleviating their burdens, hurt, or
suffering. Conflicts are mediated through the activity of care (i.e., focused on maintaining connection and caring in relationships) and
grounded in interdependence and interconnectedness. 16 1 The response
and care perspective requires seeing others in their own terms, contextually, and it assumes that others are different from oneself.162 Carol Gilligan and Jane Attanucci distinguished between these foci as follows:
A justice perspective draws attention to problems of inequality and
oppression and holds up an ideal of reciprocity and equal respect. A
care perspective draws attention to problems of detachment or abandonment and holds up an ideal of attention and response to need. Two
more injunctions-not to treat others unfairly and not to turn away
from someone in need--capture these different concerns .... Since
everyone has been vulnerable both to oppression and to abandonment,
two moral 1visions-one
of justice and one of care-recur in human
63
experience.
Both Gilligan and Lyons hinted that these different perspectives
were associated with gender-that is, women more dominantly expressed
the care/response focus, and men expressed themselves more often in
terms of justice or equality/rights. 16 Gilligan and Attanucci did a later
study to explore gender associations with these moral orientations.1 65
Their preliminary results indicated that both men and women express
concerns about justice and care, but they also found that "people tend to
1 66
focus on one set of concerns and minimally represent the other."
Both perspectives are important in resolving tort disputes, but the
different voice that is more common in women is practically non-existent
in tort law. Because tort law was created by men (as the only participants in its writing, thinking, and practice for many years), it is not surprising that an ethic of rights, which seems to be a controlling male
160. See
at 33.
161. See id at 33-35.
162. See id at 34.
163. Carol Gilligan & Jane Attanucci, Two Moral Orientations,in
at 73, 73-74.
164. See id. at 73, 84; Lyons, supra note 159, at 39.
165. See Gilligan & Attanucci, supra note 163, at 73.
166.
at 82. The problem with the simultaneous co-existence of these perspectives is that
they seem to contradict one another:
The tension between these perspectives is suggested by the fact that detachment, which is
the mark of mature moral judgment in the justice perspective, becomes the moral problem
in the care perspective-the failure to attend to need. Conversely, attention to the particular needs and circumstances of individuals, the mark of mature moral judgment in the care
perspective, becomes the moral problem in the justice perspective-failure to treat others
fairly, as equals.
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ethical paradigm' dominates tort analysis. Because men devised tort
laws to apply to themselves, because the ethic of rights involves an implicit assumption that others are the same as oneself, and because men
frequently viewed people as separate but "socially contracting" human
beings, legal theorists looked for solutions to conflicts that respected separation and formalized, distanced interactions. Finally, because the men
who crafted tort law were scholars, judges, and practitioners who were
rarely responsible for interpersonal caregiving, they were in socially-constructed positions that defined their responsibility financially. Thus, tort
law's definition of responsibility is financial. The men writing and thinking about tort law tended to universalize their experiences and concerns
(failing to appreciate the existence or wisdom of other perspectives) and
consequently developed a limited, incomplete definition of "legal responsibility." In its search for objective, neutral, abstract, and universal formulas for imposing responsibility, tort law became fixated on money
damages.
An ethic of responsibility and care, based on perceptions of human
beings as interconnected and mutually dependent, would enrich our legal
post-event understanding of responsibility. This perspective understands
responsibility contextually, as responsiveness to the other's or victim's
particularized needs and interdependencies. This meaning of responsibility has dominated women's ethical paradigms. Since women function (or
at least functioned) in family and interpersonal caregiving contexts, perhaps we can learn what responsibility involves from some of the tasks
that women perform within families. 16 7 From there, we can see how this
interpersonal, caregiving meaning of responsibility might apply in tort
law.
There is a lot of emotional work to caregiving and being responsi168
ble.
The work involves physical and emotional care. Caregiving responsibility involves direct interpersonal tasks, rather than delegation,
and it is time-consuming, emotionally involved, freedom-limiting (in that
one must often be there in person rather than pursuing other interests),
energy-draining, demanding, rewarding, and essential to human survival.
This interpersonal responsibility necessitates sharing time, attention, and
consciousness in a manner completely ignored by the legal system.
167. Women's family caregiving tasks involve more than the care of children and spouses. Emily Abel makes clear that adult daughters have been the primary caregivers for frail, elderly parents
and women have been the primary caregivers for the elderly generally. Emily Abel, Adult Daughters
and Carefor the Elderly, 12 FEMINIST STUD. 479, 483-85 (1986).
168. See ARLE HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HUMAN FEELING ix-x (1983) (recognizing the concept of emotional work or labor).
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Currently in tort law, when we hold a defendant legally responsible
for the harm caused, we make the defendant pay. This is very similar to
what we do to absentee fathers when we hold them responsible. And
paying is important. The money is necessary for survival and to have
access to opportunities in our society. But when a tort victim is injured
or incapacitated, a great deal of caregiving work is necessary 169 no matter how much money is paid. The burden of this caregiving work traditionally falls on the family and friends of the injured, on spiritual
communities, or on people hired to do some of these tasks-usually
lower class women who are paid too little and given no prestige for this
vital work. This responsibility is not deemed to be the responsibility of

the tortfeasor.
Tort law could result in corporations and corporate officer defendants taking more interpersonal caregiving responsibility. First, common
law tort theory would have to acknowledge that financial responsibility
alone is inadequate for legal responsibility, as I have argued above. A
feminist voice of responsibility, 170 which includes emotional, caregiving
work, has not been readily translatable into money, so tort law has basically ignored it. Tort law, as currently constructed, has been unable to
imagine another medium of value. Common law tort must carefully reconstruct its understanding of injury so that it includes both financial
loss and a recognition that injury is an emotional, physical, and spiritual
event. New kinds of remedies must be developed-remedies that respond to victims' needs for community, care, and relationships, and rem169. The needs of injured victims vary according to particularized contexts, but interpersonal
caregiving responsibility might include: making doctor appointments and taking the victims to that
appointment, taking them to therapy, and monitoring their health care; providing transportation and
medical equipment to make them mobile (e.g., wheelchairs), and altering living spaces to accommodate new physical needs; shopping, food preparation, and home repairs; managing their financesmaking sure they don't lose their jobs or educational opportunities, paying bills, and helping them
get benefits to which they are entitled; time-sharing and keeping company in hospitals; offering emotional support-hand-holding, tear-wiping, distracting them from pain, lifting their spirits, bearing
their anger, depression, resentment, and hatred.
These are just a few samples of the many different kinds of interpersonal caregiving tasks that
must be done. How can the legal system hold corporate defendants responsible for some or all of
these activities, which inevitably follow from serious physical and psychological injury? How can we
make those who cause harm take this kind of interpersonal, caregiving, needs-based responsibility?
170. I would like to reemphasize that labeling this "feminist" does not mean it occurs in all
females, or that it does not occur in men, or that it is biologically linked, or that it is essential or
fixed. See generally Bender, FeministSolidarity, supra note 7; Leslie Bender, Sex Discriminationor
Gender Inequality?, 57 FORDHAM L. Rav. 941 (1989) [hereinafter Bender, Sex Discrimination]. I
do mean it has been socially and psychologically constructed in our culture as part of the woman's
role or expected behavior. The historical fact is that these tasks have been assigned to women in the
past and that they have shaped our gender construction of the feminine. In arguing for the paradigm
shift in our legal value system, I am arguing for a paradigm shift in our legal value construction as
well.
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edies that require corporate officers and responsible individual
defendants to perform the physical and emotional caregiving work.1 7 1
After they are adequately trained, individual defendants, corporate officers, and employees who cause harms (in the pre-event responsibility
sense) could be required to provide caregiving services to their victims
(or persons similarly situated). 172 Defendants who have caused harm in
their corporate roles will have to make personal sacrifices. 173 The corporations that employ them will have to sacrifice some of their services
during the day. Profits, productivity, and efficiency will be affected, but
if we start from a premise of interconnectedness as the human condition
and understand the necessity for responsibility and care, efficiency, and
productivity must take a second seat.
The second way in which tort law can force corporate defendants to
assume more needs-based responsibility is if the tort system acknowledges that when an accident or harm occurs, victims live with the consequences every day. Even though the injuries were not the victims' fault,
they must be in touch with the reality of the harm all the time. Defendants who are responsible for harms should have the same experience;
they should be required to respond to those harms for as long as the
innocent victims suffer. It is not "punishment" for the defendant to have
to continue to perform caregiving in response to the harm caused, any
more than it is "punishment" for families of victims to have to do it or
the victim to have to cope with the continuing effects of the injury and
harm. It is life. It is being human, social, interconnected, and "responsi171. Defendants who are inexperienced in caregiving may need to be trained in how to do physical caretaking to provide emotional care and support, to focus on another's needs, and to respond to
them. How can you teach someone to give care? This task may be difficult, but we do it every day in
training children and in training students or apprentices in caregiving professions. The more complicated question is whether care by someone legally forced to provide it would be worse than no care
at all. Would it feel demeaning and awful to the recipient? It is difficult enough to accept ideas like
Rousseau's about forcing people to be free: What about forcing people to give care? We need to
think seriously about what this really means, how it could be accomplished, and the effects it would
have on the victims or recipients of this kind of care.
Maybe it is not giving care that we ought to require of tortfeasors, but performing some of the
traditional caregiving functions to alleviate the burden on family and friends. The point I want to
emphasize here is that as difficult as it might be to conceptualize requiring care or caregiving behavior from mass tortfeasors, by not requiring this kind of interpersonal responsibility from defendants,
we impose these responsibilities on family members or loving friends. It does not go away because
we do not require defendants to do it. It is just silenced.
172. It certainly is possible that a particular victim would not want to see or be with the person
who had caused her the harm she suffers. In that case defendants may be required to take interpersonal caregiving responsibility for a different, but similarly situated person, whereas other defendants
might take some interpersonal caregiving responsibility for the first victim.
173. I realize that in mass tort situations, it will be impossible for harmcausers to care for each of
the victims, because the extent of harm and numbers of victims are so great. Whatever care can be
given will result in more than there would have been.
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ble." Unlike the victim, the responsible party does not have to cope with
the injury and its consequences for twenty-four hours a day, but each
day, every day, she ought to be required to do something in response to
the victim's suffering.
Third, the tort system will have to undergo a more general paradigm
shift with respect to values and responsibility. We need feminist (re)torts
to help change the dominant ideology from individualist to interconnected. We need to shift from a rights-based focus to a focus on both
care and rights/justice, from power-over to empowering, from the priority of the market and money to a priority of personal relationships,
health, safety, and human dignity in deciding personal injury disputes.
The solution is not to substitute one paradigm for another, but rather it is
constructing a new paradigm that melds the valuable components of both
approaches.
If making individual defendants within corporations take personal
responsibility for the harms they cause is a goal of tort law-and I would
argue it should be a primary goal-then those defendants must not be
able to pay someone else to do caregiving tasks for them. This aspect of
responsibility ought to be non-delegable. It is the personal, time-consuming, responsiveness-to-particularized-needs-of-others kind of responsibility that must be acknowledged and imposed both on individuals and on
roles within the corporate structure even if the "culpable" officers have
departed. The corporation as an entity will also be fulfilling its direct,
interpersonal responsibility when it sacrifices some of its executives' and
employees' time everyday to do this kind of caregiving work.
I am the first to admit that there are a lot of questions with this
model. How can we make people care? How can the law enforce this
kind of responsibility? Is required caregiving worse than no care at all?
Who as a victim would want the harm-causers personally involved in
their lives? How much time and energy should a harm-causer devote to
this kind of caregiving, considering she must still be able to keep her job
and meet her own family obligations? It must be remembered, though,
that these ideas are proposed as a rethinking of our legal organization
and expressed values. In order to implement them, we may need to
change the structure of the workplace to permit people to spend more
time in direct, interpersonal caregiving. 174 But change must begin somewhere. If we agree that money is inadequate to salve the pain and loss of
victims, and money has proved inadequate to deter the creation of nondemocratically imposed risks and harms on innocent members of the
public, then we have a compelling need for a reimagined approach. Ma174. See, eg., Bender, Sex Discrimination, supra note 170, at 949.
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jor paradigmatic shifts in our values or social organization are very difficult to imagine. We are so inculcated with the dominant ideological
premises and our existing conditions that our vision is hampered. I know
that mine is. But I feel confident in the superiority of the reordered values from which I am working, and I believe in our human capacity to
change and imagine change.
Something is terribly wrong with our social-economic-political system when we have repeated instances of mass harms and toxic poisonings
caused by corporate activities or products. And the situation continues
to worsen. When we try to solve the problem by relying on money, we
dig ourselves deeper into the same pit. To alter our consciousness about
solutions for personal injuries, we need to prioritize values other than
dollars and economic growth, and we need to develop remedies other
than money damages. We should look to values of human health, safety,
and dignity, values of democratic participation, values of relationships
and caring. These values are already part of our vocabulary. We use
them in legal opinions, in our conversations, in our reactions to harms,
and in our social systems, but we end up giving them lip service instead
of acting upon them in tort law. This is a place for feminist (re)torts.
We cannot say that values of care and safety are antithetical to
human nature because every day we find powerful examples of human
sharing, support, and responsibility. We just have to figure out how to
transfer that method of relating to others and that way of acting into a
new legal paradigm. We have to jiggle those values loose from their hallowed pedestals where they shine brightly but have no effect.
Substantial changes like these--changes in the priorities of our values and in our underlying assumptions-cannot happen overnight. But
if we do not imagine change, work for it, and think through it, it will not
occur at all. If we say these changes cannot occur because money is the
only language understood by tort law and business, then we can never
improve our situation, and we will always remain on the edge of a liability crisis. Half the battle is changing how we think about things. We
must start somewhere.
CONCLUSION

I have tried to share several thoughts in this Article. First, the tort
system has been wrongly blamed for a liability crisis that is the result of
corporate violence and the political-legal structure of our nation. Tort
law does not create injuries. It neither defines the permissible structures
for corporate organizations nor does it set the limits on corporate power.
Tort law also does not create the social norms that value money and
efficiency over health or safety. When our legal and political structures
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permit relatively unchecked accumulations of wealth and power in corporate for-profit enterprises and when criminal or civil sanctions are erratically imposed on corporations for their harm-causing or riskimposing behavior, the stage is set for the problems of mass tort law.
Mass tort victims have been accused of greed and abuse of the system,
but in fact it is the injured parties who have been abused by corporations'
greed and abuse. Corporations undemocratically impose health and
safety risks on the public in their pursuit of private profit. When a rape
victim testifies about the crime perpetrated against her, our legal system
questions whether she is telling the truth, whether she invited or consented to the harm, and whether what she endured is "real harm."
When a mass tort victim testifies about the harm or risk imposed upon
her, our legal system questions whether she is telling the truth, whether
she invited the harm or consented to it, whether it is a real harm, and
whether she is just after a quick buck. Rather than deal directly with
male violence to eliminate rape, we turn our attention to the victim as the
possible problem. Rather than deal with corporate violence and corporate organizational forms, misplaced priorities, and lack of interpersonal
responsibility to end mass torts, we turn our attention to the victim and
limiting access to the tort system. I ask us to examine this practice and
refocus our attention on the real sources of harm.
Feminist theories and methods offer new ways to think about mass
torts committed by profit-seeking corporations. Feminism teaches us
that systems assumed to be neutral and necessary are in fact biased, and
that systems like legal systems are based on implicit, unstated assumptions that favor those in power. 17 5 It asks us to examine our social-political-legal structures for ways in which power is reinforced and groups or
persons are subordinated or undervalued. Feminism also suggests alternative perspectives on human interconnection and responsibility. Applying these insights, I looked at some aspects of the legal and social system
that foster corporate harm-causing and risk-imposition: the false dichotomies of public/private and individual/collective that fail to capture the
nature of corporate actions, thereby creating a legal environment unable
to impose appropriate responsibility on corporations and their decisionmakers for their harms; a commodified system of remedies in which
injury, justice, and responsibility are translated into dollar values; and
the misallocation of the burden of proof and the presumption of liability
on the less-empowered plaintiff in mass tort cases-a phenomenon that
ignores the enormously greater power and resources available to corporate defendants. These aspects of our social and legal system which fos175. See Minow, supra note 105, at 47-49.
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ter risk imposition are ripe for feminist (re)torts. Based on a feminist
conception of empowerment, I have suggested shifting the burden of
proof and persuasion in mass tort to the party empowered with knowledge, resources, access to information, and familiarity with the potentially harm-causing activity. I also suggested shifting the presumption of
nonliability to the less empowered party, which means that a risk-creating defendant corporation initially would be presumed liable or responsible for victims' economic losses until the defendant corporation decides
to litigate the liability issue and wins.
Relying on feminist ethical insights about care and responsiveness to
needs, I have suggested that we need to reconsider our value priorities
and assumptions. If health, safety, well-being, environmental clean-up,
personal relationships, and care are truly our most important values,
then we cannot make them secondary to interests of efficiency or profit in
tort law litigation. If health and well-being are what we would choose
for ourselves in our daily lives, we also should choose them for society as
a whole. We must learn that health and safety are not incompatible with
or in tension with efficiency or economic progress: One need not be exchanged for the other. Ironically, the values of health, safety, and personal/community well-being have been articulated for years. In this
paradigm shift we do not need to change these values, but we will need to
be sincere about them this time instead of permitting them to be overridden by private pursuits of profit. Paradigm shifts are difficult, but they
clearly have happened in the past and can happen now as well.
As part of this change, we must reconsider what it means to find a
corporate defendant and its officers or decisionmakers responsible for
harms and for their remedies. If responsibility can be expanded to mean
responsiveness to the needs of others (from their perspective), then corporate and corporate officer responsibility would entail direct, interpersonal caregiving.
What kinds of remedies would respond better to injured persons'
needs and the goals of making tortfeasors more socially and personally
responsible? I do not know. This is something about which we all must
brainstorm. There are lots of questions left unresolved. We will have to
create rules that govern corporate organization in a way that requires
each person in the organizational chain to take responsibility (in the
power and choosing sense) for her/his actions and the consequences. We
can require corporate executives literally to sign every decision they
make and let them know that they will be held responsible. The tort
system will have to make sure that plaintiffs always can identify the individuals who are responsible (those individuals who had the power to
make decisions or affected those decisions) and impose on them both
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kinds of post-event responsibility-responsibility in the reparations sense
and the needs-based responsive caregiving sense. Caregiving responsibility would be non-delegable, and it would attach to both specific individuals as well as any persons filling specified corporate roles. We also can
create real incentives for corporate employees to identify health and
safety risks and prevent harms and mechanisms through which the public can gain access to internal corporate information about the products
and activities that create risks and harms. We can establish laws requiring all chief executive officers to live in the neighborhoods where their
factories or plants are located so that their families would be subject to
the health risks and toxins in the air, earth, and groundwater if the plant
emits them.
Our imagination is our only limit. In the criminal law system, for
example, we have developed community service obligations as social
"recompense" for crime. Initially, there were grave doubts about this
program's possibilities for success, but it has been implemented successfully. We could develop interpersonal and community service obligations as legal "recompense" for tort as well. For example, corporations
that cause certain kinds of harms, such as injuries to women's reproductive systems, could be required to use their own laboratories, clinics, and
employees to research new reproductive technologies. Corporate officers
could be required to use their skills to manage or direct these organizations for the benefit of the victims or to manage and work in hospitals,
nursing homes, educational facilities, and whatever else might be appropriate. Harm-causing scientists and researchers could be required to find
answers and research new technologies to benefit their victims. Corporate officers can be mandated to personally do the physical clean-up work
at toxic dumps or chemical/oil spills-from cleaning off oil-soaked birds
and shorelines to wearing insulated suits and scrubbing contaminated
areas. These solutions are the easiest because they more closely replicate
community service in criminal law and are variations on traditional monetary requirements to fund projects for the benefit of tort victims. In
addition, those same defendants could be required to respond directly to
the needs of one or more of their victims. That response could start with
personal apologies to each victim, 176 followed by interpersonal, caregiv176. For example, the head of a Japanese airline personally visited the families of each of the
victims of an airline crash to express his deep concern and to apologize. Hiroshi Wagatsuma &
Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20
LAW & SOc'y REv. 461, 488 (1986). That kind of action is a good start. There are stories galore
about how victim's anger continues in the absence of sincere apology. For just one poignant example, see the article by Elaine Holstein, mother of one of the victims of the Kent State massacre, who
discusses the absence of apology twenty years after the event. Elaine Holstein, And Still No Honest
Apology, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1990, at A19, col. 2.
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ing work. It is hard to imagine how the tort system could make corporate defendants and corporate decisionmakers respond with direct
interpersonal caregiving. But if that is our goal, and we work for it, then
we can make it happen. It was probably hard to imagine strict products
177
liability or medical monitoring damages fifty years ago.
There is nothing natural or necessary about legal responsibility
meaning solely financial compensation, since we have other meanings of
responsibility in our vocabulary of personal relations, and we have been
able to integrate those meanings in our social system without problem.
We can figure out how to implement them in our legal system too. Once
we have freed our thinking from the constraints of our prior economic,
rights-based model, we can be creative and thoughtful about the possibilities of other-than-monetary tort remedies. This Article does not
have "the answers," but I hope it is a start of new questions about underlying assumptions of our social-political-legal organization. In the spirit
of dialogue these feminist retorts can help us think about real, possible
changes.

177. See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 202 N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (1985), aff'd in part,

rev'dinpart,106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987) (medical monitoring); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965) (strict products liability). See also Allan Kanner, MedicalMonitoring: State
and FederalPerspectives, in PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF A Toxic TORT CASE 549 (Practising L.

Inst. 1988, Litigation Series No. 363) (examination of federal and state statutes governing medical
surveillance claims).

